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Abstract 
 
 
In this thesis, I study the financial distress status for a sample of 180 enterprises listed on Oslo 
Stock Exchange. The thesis addresses the impact of the financial crisis on these enterprises and has 
a particular focus on the probability of financial distress, measured by Edward Altman’s Z-Score 
models. I find evidence that manufacturers listed on Oslo Stock Exchange were generally more 
financially distressed than non-manufacturers, which is consistent with what one could observe at a 
national level. The estimated probability of default for the listed enterprises increased substantially 
during the crisis. The findings also indicate that the Z-Scores ability to predict bankruptcies 
significantly worsened during the financial crisis. Moreover, on the subject of capital structure, I 
document a positive relationship between financial distress and equity issuance within the financial 
crisis. Also, I find evidence that supports both the market timing theory and pecking order theory of 
corporate finance. Finally, the results indicate that there is evidence of a structural break around the 
outbreak of the financial crisis, which means that the enterprises listed on OSE were more 
financially distressed in 2008 and 2009, relative to the years 2004 to 2007.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Financial distress, Altman’s Z-Score models, Oslo Stock Exchange, Financial crisis, 
Equity issuance, Pecking order theory, Market timing by managers, Industry differences, 
Probability of default, Structural break 
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Preface 
 
The outbreak of the global financial crisis in the fall of 2008 initiated one of the most serious 
international recessions in our time, leading to radical changes in the economy. As a consequence, 
there was a clear decline in Norway’s gross domestic product from the third quarter of 2008 to the 
first quarter of 2009. The negative implications of the crisis are countless and the full consequences 
are yet to be understood, which is evident at the end of 2011 in terms of the debt crisis in Europe.  
 
During the crisis, the extent of financial distress grew as systemic risk, default rates and 
bankruptcies increased considerably throughout the Norwegian economy. In this sense, the impact 
of the recent crisis provides an excellent opportunity to study financial distress, as well as its 
implications and relations. Studying financial distress is of crucial importance in order to make an 
effective and correct assessment on the financial state of companies, especially in times of crisis. In 
this respect, strengthening the research on financial distress is vital for protection against the risk of 
bankruptcy for companies, as well as protecting the rights of investors and creditors. Hence, a 
comprehensive analysis of enterprises exposure to distress risk and investigating the risk behaviour 
in financial distress is of utmost relevance.  
 
Working on the thesis has been educational and exciting. It has been especially motivating to study 
issues of current interest and relevance. 
 
I would like to express gratitude to my supervisor at the Norwegian School of Economics, Zuzana 
Lafférsová, for good advice and supportive guidance. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Research questions 
 
In this thesis, I study the financial distress status for a sample of 180 enterprises listed on Oslo 
Stock Exchange (OSE). Year 2008 and 2009 is primarily the scope of this thesis, because this is the 
time when financial distress is likely to have been most evident, although some of the tests 
performed apply observations dating back to 2004. In this regard, the years 2004 to 2007 are 
referred to as the “pre-crisis” period and the years 2008 to 2009 as the “financial crisis” period.  
 
The thesis provides evidence on the impact of the financial crisis on these enterprises from two 
perspectives. First, I investigate the effect on different industries, especially manufacturers versus 
non-manufacturers, and whether the financial distress of enterprises was different before and during 
the crisis. The thesis mainly focuses on the probability of financial distress, measured by Edward 
Altman’s Z-Score models, which has become a popular and widely accepted measure of financial 
distress. Also, the Z-Score models are used to predict corporate defaults. The financial crisis forms 
the basis for testing the robustness and applicability of the Z-Scores, as one in retrospective can 
compare the predictions of the models to actual events. This is an appealing approach, as it dwells 
in the intersection of theory and real life. While the Z-Score models provide a continuous evaluation 
of corporate health, we cannot derive an estimate for the probability of default directly from the 
score. Hence, I have made an estimate using Altman’s bond rating equivalent method. 
 
Second, in the context of the influence of financial distress on enterprises’ behaviour and decision 
making process, I analyze the effect on their capital structure. The critical problems in the bank 
sector and reduced appetite for risk were factors that affected the supply and demand for external 
financing, resulting in significant changes in the capital structure of companies. The thesis has a 
particular focus on the link between financial distress and equity issuance. 
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The most central research questions can be summarized as follows: 
 
 Is there evidence of a structural break with regards to financial distress at the outbreak of the 
crisis? 
 Which industry groups were most affected by the crisis? 
 What is the relationship between financial distress and equity issuance and how does this 
relate to the pecking order theory and market timing by managers? 
 How did the probability of default on OSE evolve prior to and during the crisis? 
 What are the implications of the financial crisis on the predictive ability of the Z-Score 
models? 
 
1.2 Contribution to existing research and literature 
 
This thesis makes several contributions in multiple fields. First and foremost, the thesis addresses 
the impact of the financial crisis on the enterprises listed on OSE. Specifically, it has a focus on 
how the various industry groups were affected relative to each other, as well as emphasizing the 
differences between manufacturers and non-manufacturers. This may give valuable insight into 
which industries that are more likely to be exposed to financial distress. Furthermore, the thesis 
examines the predictive ability of the Z-Score models under the conditions of the financial crisis. 
Also, to my best knowledge, this is the first attempt to empirically model the structural break of 
financial distress at the outbreak of the recent financial crisis, at least based on Altman’s Z-Score. 
Finally, by investigating the impact of financial distress on the capital structure of firms, the thesis 
contributes to the corporate finance literature. The thesis particularly adds to the literature on the 
relationship between financial distress and equity issuance, as it provides new evidence on a 
positive relationship in times of crisis, as well as finding evidence of both market timing by 
managers and the pecking order theory. 
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1.3 Key results 
 
I find evidence that manufacturers listed on OSE were generally more financially distressed than 
non-manufacturers in the recent financial crisis, something that is consistent with what one could 
observe at a national level. Specifically, the findings indicate that among the most strongly affected 
are enterprises exposed to consumer durables, export and import industries dependent on 
international trade, offshore and shipping, as well as enterprises engaged in commercial properties. 
Among the least affected were enterprises involved in engineering, seismic activities and surveying 
services. Many of the findings related to the industry groups also seem to be in accordance with 
reality. Thus, the Altman Z-Score models prove to be accurate in correctly classifying the financial 
distress of firms and relevant even in times of crisis.  
 
However, the Type II error of classifying firms as bankrupt when they do not go bankrupt increased 
substantially during the crisis, with as much as 40-50% of the enterprises incorrectly classified as 
bankrupt. This indicates that the Z-Scores ability to predict bankruptcies significantly worsened in 
the financial crisis, although its ability to identify financial distress in general still may be intact. 
The increase in financial distress also implies a greater probability of default for the listed 
enterprises, which was estimated to be in excess of 10% during the crisis, in contrast to the pre-
crisis period where it was almost non-existent, based on the average of all the enterprises in the data 
sample.  
 
Moreover, on the subject of capital structure, I document a positive relationship between financial 
distress and equity issuance in the financial crisis. Also, I find evidence that supports both the 
market timing theory and pecking order theory of corporate finance. Evidence of the market timing 
of managers was found just before the outbreak of the crisis, i.e. in 2006 and 2007. The results 
indicate that equity issuance at historically high stock prices was followed by post-issue under-
performance, as the issuers tended to be more financially distressed than non-issuers. Related to the 
pecking order theory, the findings indicate that the financially distressed enterprises followed the 
predicted pattern of the theory over the course of the crisis, in the sense that internal financing 
typically was depleted before using external financing. The findings indicate that the adverse 
selection problem was particularly evident among financially distressed enterprises that issued 
equity just prior to and during the crisis, which also is in line with the pecking order theory.  
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Finally, the results indicate that there is evidence of a structural break around the outbreak of the 
financial crisis, which means that the enterprises listed on OSE were more financially distressed in 
2008 and 2009, compared to the years 2004 to 2007.  
 
1.4 Limitations of the study 
 
Perhaps the most important weakness of the thesis is that I am relying solely on the Z-Score models 
as the only means of analysis. Including other measures of financial distress would have 
strengthened the results. It is also possible that the thesis has a geographic limitation, in the sense 
that the findings related to the enterprises listed on OSE might not be directly transferable to other 
settings. For instance, it may be that certain conditions in Norway are decisive for the findings. 
Testing the validity for some of the results on broader stock exchanges may help to clarify this 
potential restriction. 
 
1.5 Structure of the study 
 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 accounts for the development of OSE during the crisis, 
defines the term financial distress, as well as presenting reasons for corporate failures and the Z-
Score models. Chapter 3 presents the data collection process and the final data sample used in the 
study. Chapter 4 concerns the analysis of the introduced research questions, which presents the 
hypotheses that are tested in the thesis, reviews the methodologies applied, as well as showing and 
discussing the empirical results. The analysis follows the sequence of the research questions 
presented previously. Chapter 5 concludes on the research questions presented in this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
2 Oslo Stock Exchange, Financial distress and Altman’s 
Z-Score models 
 
2.1 The development of Oslo Stock Exchange during the crisis 
 
This section summarizes the development of OSE over the course of the financial crisis. 
2.1.1 Year 2007 
 
The OSE Benchmark Index increased 11.5% in 2007, despite more international uncertainty in the 
second half of the year. Trading activity was higher than ever before. Growth in the companies' 
results started to slow down both at home and abroad, but many investors entered 2008 remaining 
rather optimistic about the future outlook for the global economy (Oslo Børs ASA 2007). 
 
2.1.2 Year 2008 
                                                                                Figure 1 (Norges Bank) 
                                                                                   Key ratios (%) for enterprises listed on OSE                  
After over four years of continuous growth, 
with equity values multiplying and an almost 
endless flow of positive news, the Benchmark 
Index fell by 54% in 2008, which is the 
steepest fall in Norway in modern times. 140 
companies on OSE lost more than half of 
their value. Oil prices reached new heights in 
2008, peaking when the oil price almost 
reached USD 150 per barrel, but this changed 
very quickly as the oil price decreased by almost 80%. Also, operating margins and returns on 
equity capital for the listed enterprises on OSE became negative in 2008 (FIGURE 1). (Oslo Børs 
ASA 2008). 
 
Uncertainty increased during the summer, but the major fall in stock markets came in September, 
when a number of American banks ran into major difficulties. At this point, similar problems also 
started to emerge in Europe. The investment bank Lehman Brothers collapsed and this immediately 
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led to a substantial increase in money market interest rates. Furthermore, several banks in the USA 
and Europe faced trouble and needed to recognize substantial losses due to falling housing prices. 
Consequently, some banks had to be rescued by the authorities. In addition, it became apparent that 
the emerging markets could no longer maintain their explosive growth. 
 
Efficient modern stock markets have the property that share prices follow the expectations for 
future economical developments. Therefore, the large decrease in share prices were partly due to the 
market’s anticipating weaker economic growth and earnings in the future. Other factors that played 
an important role were behavioural elements such as panic and high levels of uncertainty, which in 
retrospective indicates that some shares suffered from over-reactions. The dramatic falls in share 
prices do however also suggest that a great number of shares were priced with substantial 
bankruptcy risk (Oslo Børs ASA 2008). 
 
2.1.3 Year 2009 
 
Following the terrible year of 2008, the OSE Benchmark Index increased 64.8% over the course of 
2009. Financial markets were returning to normal conditions, as evidenced by a slow return of risk 
willingness among investors. Companies focused on cutting costs in order to improve their results, 
which helped corporate earnings to start increasing again in 2009, together with renewed revenue 
growth.  Although OSE was one of the best performing stock markets in the world in 2009, it 
should be remembered that it was one of the worst performers in 2008. 
 
The year started out rather cautious, but it became increasingly evident during the spring that the 
emergency policy packages and other measures implemented by authorities around the world were 
dampening the worst consequences of the financial crisis. In addition, some signs of improved 
access to financing started to appear. Bond markets in particular improved as key economic 
indicators at first levelled off and then started to turn upwards. Demand for commodities returned as 
optimism recovered. This contributed to the oil price almost doubling during 2009, which definitely 
had its positive effect on the OSE. (Oslo Børs ASA 2009). 
 
Although 2009 was a very good year for the market as a whole, one in five of the listed companies 
saw a decrease in its share price, which shows that the market differentiated between enterprises to 
a greater extent. Several enterprises with liquidity problems were quick to arrange new financing, 
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which not only provided a lifeline for their investors and employees, but also contributed to 
restoring confidence in the capital markets.  
 
However, not all issuers were able to access new capital. Thus, it may be the case that investors 
were more selective than in the years before the crisis, which was reflected in a number of company 
failures, in fact the first on OSE since 2002. During 2009, seven companies listed on OSE and Oslo 
Axess became insolvent and went bankrupt. Tandberg Data and Tandberg Storage, both listed on 
OSE, went bankrupt in 2009. In addition to these bankruptcies, a number of companies struggled 
with financial challenges, which are high up on the list of shares that fell most in value. This 
indicates that 2009 was a year when investors separated the healthy from the unhealthy companies, 
with risk capital readily available for those companies and projects that represented an acceptable 
level of risk, while several companies with high indebtedness and weak cash flows had trouble with 
attracting investors (Oslo Børs ASA 2009). 
 
2.2 Financial distress and financial distress costs 
 
This section defines the term financial distress, its implications for the market value of a firm and 
the key factors that determine the present value of financial distress costs.  
 
Financial distress occurs when obligations to creditors are broken or honoured with difficulty by 
failing to make the required interest or principal payment on the debt. Sometimes financial distress 
leads to bankruptcy. However, it could just mean that the company is in an unfavourable and risky 
position. Financial distress is costly, arising from bankruptcy or distorted business decisions, which 
represent an important departure from Modigliani and Miller’s assumption of perfect capital 
markets. Modigliani and Miller assumed that the cash flows of a firm’s assets are independent of its 
choice of capital structure, but leveraged firms risk incurring financial distress costs that reduce the 
cash flows available to investors. 
 
Investors are aware of the potential financial difficulties related to leveraged firms. Consequently, 
investors worry about the costs of financial distress, something that is believed to be reflected in the 
current market value of the firm. Even if the firm is not currently in financial distress, investors 
include the potential for future distress into their assessment of the market value. Thus, if there is a 
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possibility of bankruptcy, the firm’s current market value is reduced by the present value of these 
potential financial distress costs. (Berk and DeMarzo 2011). 
 
Three key factors determine the present value of financial distress costs. First, the probability of 
financial distress depends on the likelihood that a firm will be unable to fulfill its debt obligations 
and therefore default, which increases with the amount of a firm’s liabilities relative to its assets, as 
well as the volatility of a firm’s cash flows and asset values. Financial distress is generally more 
likely for companies with high business risk, which is why companies associated with high risk 
often issue less debt. The probability of financial distress is the main topic raised in this thesis. 
Second, the magnitude of the financial distress costs will depend on the presence of direct and 
indirect bankruptcy costs. More debt is equivalent with a higher chance of default, thereby 
increasing the expected value of the associated costs. The costs can be broken down in three 
components. Direct bankruptcy costs (primarily legal and administrative costs), indirect bankruptcy 
costs (reflecting the difficulty of managing a company when it faces bankruptcy) and costs of the 
threat of bankruptcy (such as poor investment decisions resulting from conflicts of interest between 
stakeholders, e.g. agency costs). Third, the appropriate discount rate for the distress costs will 
depend on the firm’s market risk (Berk and DeMarzo 2011). 
 
2.3 Reasons for corporate failures 
 
This section provides common reasons for corporate failures. 
 
A high corporate failure rate is not always a cause for concern. Entries and exits are part of the 
process whereby companies react to market reality, i.e. changing consumer preferences and new 
technologies. Low productivity firms exit the market and are substituted by better ones. In other 
words, there is a continuous flow of resources from inefficient users to more efficient users. This is 
often referred to as “creative destruction”, which is an essential part of a strong and healthy 
economy.  An optimal social strategy is not necessarily to reduce bankruptcies to zero, but instead 
to support viable companies and letting some companies fail in order to improve economic 
efficiency and growth. 
 
The most common reason for a company’s distress and possible failure is some type of managerial 
incompetence. Companies naturally fail for multiple reasons, but management failure is often at the 
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core of the problems. The ultimate cause of failure is often simply running out of cash and other 
liquid funds. There are multiple factors that contribute to bankruptcies and other distressed 
conditions. These reasons include (Altman and Hotchkiss 2006): 
 
 Chronically sick industries (e.g. agriculture and textiles) 
 Deregulation of industries (e.g. airlines, financial services, health care, energy) 
 High real interest rates in certain periods 
 International competition 
 Overcapacity within an industry 
 Increased leveraging of corporations 
 Relatively high new business formation rates in certain periods 
 
While some of these reasons are rather obvious, some of them deserve an explanation. Deregulation 
removes the protection of a regulated industry and causes large numbers of entering companies. 
Therefore, competition is fiercer in a deregulated environment. Furthermore, it is plausible that 
increased international competition may have a negative impact on some industries, since not all 
companies have the necessary resources or opportunities needed to adapt to the continuous change 
and restructuring related to the development of new products, technologies and innovation. Hence, 
global competition may lead to more bankruptcies within certain industries. The impact of increased 
leverage varies among industries. For instance, the future cash flows of airlines are unstable and 
sensitive to shocks in the economy, so they run the risk of bankruptcy if they use too much 
leverage, while retailers can borrow more because their assets are tangible and relatively safe. New 
business formation is usually based on an optimistic outlook for the future, but history shows that 
young companies fail with greater frequency than older companies do. Thus, one might expect to 
observe that the failure rate increases in the years following a surge in new business activity. 
 
2.4 Edward Altman’s Z-Score Models 
 
This section presents the Z-Score models applied in this thesis to measure financial distress. 
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2.4.1 The original Z-Score model 
 
In 1968, NYU Professor Edward Altman created the Z-Score model, which is the first multivariate 
credit scoring model. The model predicts the likelihood that a firm will go bankrupt by combining 
five financial statement and market value measures to produce the Z-Score, which involves 
measuring how closely a firm resembles other firms that have filed for bankruptcy. This allows the 
user to classify firms as either distressed (high risk of bankruptcy) or non-distressed. In this sense, 
the Z-Score measures corporate financial health and provides a foundation for more secure 
investment decisions and better assessments of firms’ credit worthiness. It should be noted that the 
original Z-Score model is primarily for manufacturers.  
 
Altman’s original Z-Score was based on a sample of 66 publicly held manufacturing companies. 
Half of the companies were distressed manufacturers that had filed for bankruptcy from 1946 
through 1965, while the other half were randomly selected non-bankrupt companies from the same 
time period. The asset size of the companies ranged from $1 million to $25 million (Altman 2000). 
 
Due to the large number of variables that may be significant indicators of financial distress, Altman 
chose 22 financial ratios based on relevancy and their popularity in the literature. His goal was to 
find a small number of ratios that could best distinguish between bankrupt and non-bankrupt 
corporations. From these 22 ratios, five were selected as being the best combination to predict 
corporate bankruptcy. 
 
In order to test the model, Altman calculated the Z Scores for a new sample of bankrupt and non-
bankrupt companies. The non-bankrupt companies were manufacturers that had recently reported 
deficits. This enabled him to evaluate how well the Z-Score model could distinguish between sick 
and terminally ill corporations. He found that 96% of the bankrupt firms were correctly classified as 
bankrupt, while 79% of the sick, non-bankrupt firms were correctly classified as non-bankrupt 
(Altman 2000). 
 
Furthermore, in three subsequent tests, Altman examined distressed companies from 1969 up until 
1999 in order to observe the continuing accuracy and relevance of the Z-Score model. The Z-Score 
was found to be 80-90% accurate in predicting bankruptcy one year prior to the event. The Type II 
error (classifying the firm as distressed when it does not go bankrupt), however, increased 
substantially with as much as 15-20%. Recent tests show that the average Z-Score has increased due 
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to the substantial increases in stock prices and its impact on X4, which may help explain this result. 
Consequently, it should be understood that the Z-Score is not exactly 100% accurate. It is 
recommended to compare a company’s Z-Scores over time in order to make an assessment of how 
it is doing. Z-Score profiles for distressed companies often indicate a consistent downward trend as 
they approach bankruptcy.  
 
Altman’s results suggests that the Z-Score is an accurate forecaster of bankruptcy up to two years 
prior to distress and that accuracy diminishes substantially as the lead time increases. Thus, the Z-
Score model has retained its high accuracy and is still quite robust despite being developed over 40 
years ago. Over the years, the Z-Score model has become a popular tool among analysts, as it has 
proved to be one of the best statistical models for determining the health of companies and 
estimating the likelihood of bankruptcy within 1 to 2 years. This is why I decided to use the Z-Score 
model as the basis for the study of financial distress. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Z-Score is calculated by multiplying each of the financial ratios by an appropriate coefficient 
and then adding the results together. The lower the score, the greater is the risk of financial distress, 
as a company with a Z-score of -2 is in worse condition than one with a score of 1. However, the Z-
Score indicates a condition of financial distress with a high probability of bankruptcy at both levels. 
The coefficients describe the importance of each ratio, since larger coefficients affect the Z-score 
more. Each of the ratios is discussed below (Altman 2000): 
Altman’s original Z-Score: 
Z = 1.2(X1) + 1.4(X2) + 3.3(X3) + 0.6(X4) + 1.0(X5) 
where 
X1 = working capital/total assets, 
X2 = retained earnings/total assets, 
X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets, 
X4 = market value equity/book value of total liabilities, 
X5 = sales/total assets 
 
Boundary values: 
Z > 2.99 Safe Zone: Considered financially healthy 
1.81 < Z < 2.99 Grey Zone: Could go either way 
Z < 1.81 Distress Zone: Risk that company will go bankrupt within two years 
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X1: Working Capital/Total Assets 
The working capital/total assets ratio is a measure of the net liquid assets of the firm relative to the 
total capitalization. Working capital is equal to the difference between current assets and current 
liabilities, while total assets include both current and fixed assets. In this ratio, liquidity and size 
characteristics are explicitly taken into account. A firm with consistent operating losses will often 
have shrinking current assets in relation to total assets.  
 
X2: Retained Earnings/Total Assets 
Retained earnings report the accumulated reinvested earnings and/or losses of a firm. It is found in 
the Stockholders Equity section of the Balance Sheet. The ratio measures the cumulative long-term 
profitability of the company and implicitly considers the age of a firm. Studies have shown that 
corporate failures are much more common in a firm’s earlier years, as many firms that go bankrupt 
are relatively young ones that have not yet had the time to build up its cumulative earnings. Hence, 
it makes sense that young companies are more likely to default on their obligations. In addition, X2 
measures the leverage of a firm. Companies with high retained earnings relative to total assets have 
to a greater extent financed their assets through retention of earnings rather than debt financing, 
which may reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy. 
 
X3: Earnings Before Interest and Taxes/Total Assets 
This ratio illustrates the productivity of the company’s assets before tax or leverage factors are 
taken into consideration. Firms depend on operating efficiently through the earning power of its 
assets in order to have long-term viability. Return on total assets appears to be particularly 
appropriate for predicting bankruptcies, since it has the highest weighting in each of the Z-Score 
models. EBIT is found in the company’s Income Statement. 
 
X4: Market Value of Equity/Book Value of Total Liabilities 
The market value of equity is the combined market value of all shares of common and preferred 
stock. Total liabilities include all current and long-term liabilities found in the firm’s Balance Sheet. 
X4 indicates how much the company’s assets can decline in value before the liabilities exceed the 
assets and it becomes insolvent. Equity to debt also emphasizes the leverage of the firm. The higher 
the debt relative to the equity, the more high risk the firm is considered as. In addition, this ratio 
adds a market dimension to the Z-Score, within the meaning that falling stock prices may be a sign 
of upcoming problems. This should ensure that systematic risk is incorporated in the model, which 
is essential when considering the financial crisis.  
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Also, the market value of equity partly reflects a company’s credit risk and risk of bankruptcy. 
When the stock market sentiment is overall positive, and stock prices are generally high, it will be 
easier for companies to borrow money and attract cash on the stock exchange through equity issues. 
Thus, the market value’s impact on X4 partly incorporates the funding accessibility of enterprises in 
the Z-Score model, in the sense that a low ratio may indicate that the company might encounter 
difficulties in obtaining financing. This is also an important aspect in the context of the financial 
crisis. 
 
X5: Sales/Total Assets 
The asset-turnover ratio is a standard financial ratio measuring the ability of the company’s assets to 
generate sales and the management’s capacity in dealing with competitive conditions. Sales are 
categorized as revenues in the company's Income Statement. One should use net sales, which 
reflects the deduction of returns, allowances and discounts. Altman found that X5 is the least 
significant on an individual basis, but it is quite important because of its unique relationship to the 
other ratios in the Z-Score for manufacturers. 
 
2.4.2 Adapting the Z-Score model for non-manufacturers 
 
Later on, Altman also developed a modified Z”-Score model for non-manufacturers and private 
manufacturers. This was done mainly because of the limitations of the original Z-Score model, 
which is based on data sources that make it inappropriate for other firms than public manufacturers. 
Two of the original Z-Score’s ratios have tended to limit its usefulness on firms that are not publicly 
traded manufacturers.  
 
One of these ratios is X4, the Market Value of Equity divided by Total Liabilities. Clearly, if a firm 
is not publicly traded, its equity has no market value. This has the consequence that private firms 
cannot use the original Z-Score. Thus, Altman decided to use the book value of equity, not the 
market value, as the fourth variable in the modified version. By using the book value of equity for 
X4 in the Z”-Score model, Altman avoids restricting its applicability to just public non-
manufacturers (Altman 2000). 
 
The Z”-Score can be applied to public non-manufacturers as well. Altman demonstrates this by 
applying the Z”-Score to study Enron and Worldcom prior to their failures (Altman and Hotchkiss 
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2006). On the other hand, removing the market value of equity from X4 should to some degree 
reduce the X4 variable’s usefulness on public enterprises, even though it has the lowest weight 
(1.05) of all the ratios. Hence, it is recommended to use the original Z-Score model on public 
manufacturers, which I have done, since it is specifically developed for this type of companies and 
is therefore more suitable.  
 
The other ratio that restricts the usefulness of the original Z-Score is X5, Assets Turnover, as it 
varies significantly by industry. Hence, this ratio is excluded from the modified Z”-Score model. 
Altman did this in order to minimize the sensitivity of the industry effect, which makes the model 
useful for a wider range of non-manufacturing companies (Altman 2000). 
 
I believe this model is more appropriate for non-manufacturers than the original Z-score. Naturally, 
models developed for specific industries (e.g. retailers, airlines etc.) would be an even better method 
for assessing distress potential of firms in the same industry, but such models are hard to come by 
(Altman and Hotchkiss 2006). However, the Z”-Score should be appropriate for the primary and 
tertiary/service industries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4.3 Problems and limitations of the Z-Score models 
 
The Z-Score models have proven to be a reliable tool for predicting corporate failures in a broad 
variety of contexts and markets. However, it should be noted that the Z-Score is not valid in every 
situation, as the models have drawn several objections over the years. 
 
The models should only be used for forecasting financial distress if the company being analyzed is 
comparable to the firms in Altman’s samples (Altman 2000). The data that Altman used as the basis 
The modified Z"-Score model: 
 Z" = 3.25 + 6.56 (X1) + 3.26 (X2) + 6.72 (X3) + 1.05 (X4) 
 
Boundary values: 
Z > 5.85 Safe Zone 
4.35 < Z < 5.85 Grey Zone 
Z < 4.35 Distress Zone 
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of the models is now several decades old, which is evident in the original Z-Score, since it uses data 
from relatively small firms with total asset values ranging between $1 million and $25 million. 
Thus, it is not particularly appropriate for small firms with total assets values less than $1 million, 
since they may have different ratios than larger firms. Also, the Z-Score models are generally not 
appropriate for small corporations with little or no earnings.  
 
Altman has tested the accuracy of the original Z-score model on companies selected regardless of 
their asset size and it appears to be sufficiently robust to handle large companies. A frequent 
argument is that financial ratios, by their very nature, have the effect of deflating statistics by size, 
and that therefore a good deal of the size effect is eliminated (Altman 2000). Thus, the original Z-
Score model should be applicable on firms with more than $25 million in total assets.  The model 
for non-manufacturers is based on companies with total assets averaging approximately $100 
million (Covering business credit 2001), which makes it is more comparable to publicly listed 
enterprises in Norway. 
 
Furthermore, the models use unadjusted accounting data. For instance, one-time write-offs can 
cause dramatic changes in the Z-Scores from quarter to quarter. In addition, the models have the 
weakness of not being immune to false accounting practices. It is stated by Altman that the retained 
earnings account is subject to manipulation via corporate quasi-reorganizations and stock dividend 
declarations, which may cause a bias (Altman 2000). Altman also states that retained earnings 
relative to total assets (X2) has shown a marked deterioration in the average values of non-
distressed firms in the past years. Therefore, he reduced the ratio’s impact on Z”-Scores in the 
subsequent model for non-manufacturing firms. EBIT may also be exposed to manipulation of 
accounting data. 
 
Because the market value of equity is substituted by the book value, the Z”-Score for non-
manufacturers will not pick up bankruptcies caused by factors other than those that show up on the 
Balance Sheet, like unexpected business disruptions for instance. This makes the Z”-Score 
especially vulnerable to potential manipulation of accounting data, as it is unadjusted. 
 
The Z-score models should not be applied on financial firms due to their frequent use of off-
balance-sheet items (Altman 2000). However, it is a known fact that financial enterprises were to 
varying degrees negatively affected by the crisis, so the financial industry is not the most interesting 
to examine. 
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Another consideration is the volatility of the results of the original Z-Score due to stock price 
changes. The results of the model may vary over time, which may be explained by the uncertainty 
of stock prices, since they are subject to the stock market’s opinion. During periods when the stock 
market is relatively high, the Z-Score outcomes will be higher than in times when stock prices are 
low. As I have mentioned, recent tests show that the average Z-Score has increased due to the 
substantial increases in stock prices and its impact on X4 (Altman 2000). It is possible that 
mispriced stocks would create a bias among the Z-Scores, for instance in the case of stock price 
bubbles. Because the market value of equity is part of the formula, this should be kept in mind when 
evaluating the results.  
 
Despite these concerns, the Z-Score models are still among the best-known and widely used 
measures of financial distress. These credit risk models have proven to be important tools to help 
analyze corporate health and the possibility of bankruptcy. In order to strengthen and verify the 
results, the models can be supplemented with other analytical tools. 
 
3 Data 
 
In order to apply Altman’s Z-Score models for the purpose of measuring the financial distress of 
enterprises listed on OSE, I needed to gather the necessary data. Samples were drawn from 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing companies and Z-Scores were measured. The data sample 
consists of a total of 180 publicly listed enterprises, including 913 measured Z-Score observations 
spanning the years 2004 to 2009. This chapter introduces the data collection process and outlines 
the final samples, as well as a comment on retained earnings. A summary of the data sample is 
found in the appendix. 
 
3.1 The sample collection process 
 
I decided to retrieve annual data for the years 2004 to 2009 for those enterprises that have been 
listed the whole period. In the case where an enterprise, either manufacturer or non-manufacturer, 
was listed later than 2004 or delisted before 2009, I have only included the years when it was listed 
on OSE in the sample. In this respect, I retrieved market data published by OSE, most importantly 
the list changes, which gives a summary of all listings, de-listings, changes of list and changes of 
name (Oslo Børs ASA 2011). This was important because it gave me an overview of the companies 
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listed in 2009, in addition to the companies that have been delisted in the period under 
consideration. Because the sample only consists of listed enterprises, I could track each enterprise 
back in time to find out when it was really listed. There are two main reasons why I chose not to use 
quarterly data in the thesis. First, I believe that annual data is adequate to successfully complete the 
objectives of the thesis. Also, the sample consists of many enterprises in any given year, which 
strengthens the explanatory power of the results. Second, quarterly data was more difficult to 
acquire, as I had trouble finding a database containing quarterly data for public enterprises in 
Norway. 
 
To calculate the Z-Scores, accounting data is the most vital component, which is published in the 
enterprises’ financial statements. In this respect, it is essentially data from the Balance Sheet and 
Income Statement of the enterprises that I needed to collect. The database ORBIS, which contains 
company information across the world, provided me with a detailed presentation of each 
enterprise’s financial statement in the relevant years (ORBIS 2011). This includes both the balance 
sheet and profit & loss account (income statement).  However, I was unable to retrieve the 
accounting data for a few of the enterprises listed on OSE in 2009, because I could not find the 
relevant information about them on the ORBIS database. This concerns Dockwise, Intex Resources, 
Bionor Pharma, Nio Security, Northern Offshore, Prosafe Production Public, EOC.  It was also 
difficult to find the relevant data on ORBIS for several of companies that were delisted from OSE 
in 2008 and 2009. Still, I was able to obtain the necessary data for some of them. The delisted 
companies included in the sample are BH Ocean Carriers, Luxo, Norgani Hotels, Norman, Otrum, 
Petrobank energy and resources, Roxar, Software Innovation, Stavanger Aftenblad, Stepstone and 
Synnøve Finden. 
 
Furthermore, I had to retrieve the market value of equity to compute the fourth ratio of the Z-Score 
for manufacturers. Amadeus 2.0 is the client I used for obtaining the market value of equity, i.e. the 
market capitalization, of each listed company from the database of Børsprosjektet NHH 
(Børsprosjektet NHH 2011). For a given company, the market cap of each year is taken from that 
year’s last trading day in December. In the context of calculating the Z-Score, the optimal would be 
to match the dates of the market cap and the publication of the annual financial statement, because 
this is the point in time where the accounting data is most likely to be accurately reflected in the 
market value of equity. Though it varies between companies, this is usually in January/February, 
resulting in a slight mismatch between the dates of the market cap and the publication of the 
financial statement. However, considering that the past publishing dates are often unknown and 
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tend to vary, I argue that the last trading day of the year is the best approximation for the market 
cap. Additionally, it has previously been noted that the date of the market value does not need to 
correspond exactly with the date of the financial statement. 
 
One of the main goals of the thesis is to examine which industries were most distressed in the 
financial crisis. This means that I had to group the companies in the sample into fitting industries. 
ORBIS gave me access to general information about the companies, such as history, description and 
industry classification codes. This made it possible to sort all the companies using Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, which is a United States government system for classifying 
industries (United States Department of Labor 2011). The whole SIC codes are four digits, but 
using them would result in very few companies in each industry, which would give a narrow 
comparison of industries. Therefore, I have relied on the two digits SIC codes, which is a broader 
classification for major industry groups, although it still gives a clear distinction between industries. 
Figure 2 gives an overview of the grouping of enterprises into different industries. A few of the SIC 
classifications provided by ORBIS seemed inappropriate when I compared them to the description 
and history of the company. Thus, I changed the SIC code for these companies under evaluation to 
more suitable industry classifications. This concerns Bionor Pharma, Codfarmers, Hexagon 
Composites, Hurtigruten, Medi-stim, Orkla, Renewable energy corporation, Reservoir exploration 
technology, Rocksource and Simrad Optronics.  
                                                  Figure 2 
         SIC Industry Major Groups 
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Moreover, SIC codes starting with 2 and 3 are classified as manufacturing industries. Hence, I 
classify the SIC codes not beginning with 2 and 3 as non-manufacturing industries. By separating 
manufacturers from non-manufacturers, I could apply the proper Z-Score based on the industry 
classification of the enterprises.  
 
As mentioned previously, the Z-Score is not appropriate for financial companies due to their 
frequent use of off-balance-sheet items. Grouping the companies by SIC codes enabled me to 
exclude the public companies that are classified as financial from the sample, i.e. banks, insurance 
companies, brokerage houses and other firms directly involved in investments in other companies. 
This concerns DNB, Storebrand,  Acta Holding, Aktiv Kapital, ABG Sundal Collier, GTB Invest, 
Imarex, Unison Forsikring, Protector Forsikring, Skiens Aktiemølle and Voss Veksel- og 
Landmandsbank. Corporations involved in real estate activities, such as real estate agencies, are 
included in the sample (SIC Major Group 65). Even though financial activities is a central part of 
their operations, I argue that these firms do not use off-balance-sheet items to the same extent as 
banks and associated businesses, which means that they should be compatible with the Z”-Score 
model. This relates to Faktor Eiendom, Fornebu Utvikling, NEAS, Northern Logistic Property, 
Norwegian Property and Olav Thon Eiendom.  
 
3.2 Sample characteristics 
 
I decided to transform the initial Z-Scores into ordinal data, i.e. sorting them into three categories 
that can be ranked in an increasing order. These categories are 1 = financial distress zone, 2 = grey 
zone and 3 = safe zone, which is consistent with the different zones of discrimination of the Z-
Scores. There are basically three reasons that speak in favour of using ordinal data. 
 
First, the Z-Scores of manufacturers and non-manufacturers are not directly comparable. The two 
groups have different limits (1.81 and 4.35) for when they are predicted to be financially distressed 
and this would restrict me from comparing them directly. Transforming the observations into 
ordinal data and classifying them as being in one of three states solves this problem. 
 
Second, some of the companies in the sample had Z-Scores that were abnormally high or low for 
one or more years. This is especially true for some of the recently listed enterprises involved in 
mining, oil exploration and biotechnology, which typically share some of the same characteristics 
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as small firms. As mentioned, the Z-Score model is known to have problems handling small firms, 
which could cause Altman’s models to produce abnormal Z-Scores. All the firms in the sample 
have total asset values greater than $1 million. This should make them comparable in size to the 
firms that Altman used. However, this does not solve the small firm problem entirely, because a few 
of the firms in the sample have negative earnings.  
 
I have made a couple of comments regarding this observation. It seems that the Z-Score models 
have problems dealing with firms that are in a growth phase. For instance, exploration companies 
often have low asset values the first years, because they are still examining the true value of their 
resources. In addition, it takes time to build infrastructure, as well as extracting, developing and 
start selling their products, which may result in a negative EBIT. The same arguments apply to the 
biotech sector, as they often have few tangible assets, low income and high R&D costs due to 
product development, which is a time-consuming process. 
 
Figure 3  
                                                                                Histogram of Z-Scores for manufacturers                  
These outliers (very high or low Z-Scores) could 
potentially influence the results in undesirable 
ways. Sorting the data into three categories 
effectively dampens the effect of outliers on the 
results, so this is one of the reasons why I 
decided to transform the data. Third, because the 
financial crisis was systematic and affected most 
companies, it is plausible that the sample data is 
skewed towards the distress zone during 2008 
and 2009 in particular. One might expect to see that the probability for bankruptcy and financial 
distress increased for a typical company, which would result in lower Z-Scores. Figures 3 and 4 
show that this is the case during the crisis, especially for manufacturers, in the sense that the normal 
distribution seems like a poor fit for the observations. Thus, the observations in the sample are 
positively skewed or right skewed data, because the tail of the distribution points to the right. 
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Figure 4  
                                                                        Histogram of Z-Scores for non-manufacturers                  
 
This has implications for the choice of 
statistical tests, since normally distributed data 
is a prerequisite for using tests that involve the 
means and standard deviations of the two 
groups. Ordinal data opens up for using non-
parametric tests based on the medians of the 
observations.  
 
 
3.3 Retained earnings 
 
This section concerns the calculation of the second factor in Altman’s Z-Score models. Retained 
earnings are reported in the shareholders' equity section of the balance sheet and refers to the 
portion of net income which is retained by the corporation rather than distributed to its owners as 
dividends. The earnings can be retained by the company to be reinvested in its core business’ 
growth opportunities, increase liquidity or to pay debt. Similarly, if the corporation takes a loss, 
then that loss is retained and called retained losses. Thus, retained earnings can become negative, 
creating a deficit. Retained earnings and losses are cumulative from year to year with losses 
offsetting earnings. For some of the firms in the sample, retained earnings were not available on 
ORBIS for all of the years. However, the financial statements included the other components that I 
needed to compute retained earnings. I have based the calculations on the following relationship 
(Business accounting guides 2008): 
 
 
 
(RE at the end of a year is equal to the RE at the start of the year plus net income minus dividends). 
 
 
 
Retained Earnings (RE) = Beginning RE + Net Income - Dividends 
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4 Analysis 
 
This chapter presents and discusses the methodology and results from the empirical analyses that I 
performed in order to address the key research questions of the thesis. The first section gives an 
introduction to the hypothesis testing, while the second section concerns the testing of a structural 
break with regards to financial distress at the outbreak of the crisis using the Chow test. The third 
section concentrates on comparing manufacturers relative to non-manufacturers using the Mann-
Whitney test. The fourth section elaborates on the testing of differences between industry groups, 
performed with the Kruskal-Wallis test. The fifth section concerns the relationship between equity 
issuance and financial distress and how this relates to the pecking order theory and market timing 
by managers, while the sixth section deals with the probability of default measured by the bond 
equivalent rating method. Finally, the seventh section concerns the predictive ability of the Z-Score 
models, in terms of the Type I and Type II errors. 
 
4.1 Hypothesis testing 
 
The approach employed in this thesis involves conducting the tests at the 5% and 1% significance 
level, where the level of significance constitutes a limit for how low the P-value must be before we 
reject the null hypothesis (H0). The P-value tells us the probability of making a statistical Type I 
error, i.e. incorrectly rejecting H0 (Ubøe and Jørgensen 2006). The software I have used to perform 
the statistical tests is Minitab 16. 
 
It is often a realistic assumption that the data being analysed is normally distributed, but as I have 
explained above, this may be a situation where that prerequisite does not hold. In such situations, I 
want test procedures that are independent of probability distributions. Non-parametric tests do not 
require a given probability distribution, which allows me to apply them at a wider range of data. 
They are also known to be more robust than their parametric alternatives, which makes them less 
sensitive to outliers and measurement errors in the data. Taking this into account, I believe that 
using non-parametric tests is the best alternative for the purpose of testing the hypotheses of this 
thesis.  
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4.2 Comparing financial distress state before and during the financial 
crisis 
 
This section seeks to answer the research question: Is there evidence of a structural break with 
regards to financial distress at the outbreak of the crisis? 
 
4.2.1 Introduction 
 
Most of the enterprises listed on OSE were negatively affected by the financial crisis. This is 
evident in the sharp decline in share prices, which may suggest a shift towards an increased 
probability of encountering financial distress. In this regard, I want to compare the financial health 
of Norwegian public enterprises and test whether it was different before and during the financial 
crisis. In order to examine this, I need a framework that allows me to test dependent observations. 
The paired t-test is an alternative, but this assumes that the data follows a normal distribution. As 
mentioned above, this may not be the case, which restricts me from applying it for the intended 
purpose. However, this can be overcome by applying the Chow test for structural breaks. 
 
4.2.2 Data 
 
Because the same Z-Score value means something different for manufacturers and non-
manufacturers, I have divided the data and performed the Chow test separately for each industry 
group. Based on the SIC classifications, I have sorted all the listed enterprises in the data sample 
into a manufacturers sample and a non-manufacturers sample. I used the Z-Scores in their original 
values (not as ordinal data) and all the 913 observations in the data sample are included in this test. 
 
4.2.3 Methodology 
 
The Chow test for structural breaks is an econometric test used to determine whether the 
coefficients in a regression model are the same in separate subsamples. Structural breaks can occur 
in time series data when there is a sudden change in the relationship being examined. Thus, the 
approach is to test if there is a significant difference before and during the financial crisis by testing 
two different datasets. One of the datasets is the time period before the financial crisis (2004 to 
2007), and the other during the financial crisis (2008 to 2009). I took time as the variable X and Z-
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Scores for all manufacturers or non-manufacturers at a particular time as the variable Y.  This 
means that for every year I will have a lot of observations. The Chow test statistic is defined as 
(Chow 1960): 
 
 
 
 
Where RSS is the sum of squared residuals from the combined data (2004 to 2009), RSS1 is the 
sum of squared residuals from the first group (2004 to 2007) and RSS2 is the sum of squared 
residuals from the second group (2008 to 2009). N1 and N2 are the number of observations in each 
group and k is the total number of parameters (2 in this case). The test statistic follows the F 
distribution with k and N1 + N2 − 2k degrees of freedom (Chow 1960). 
 
There are mainly two factors that influence the robustness and efficiency of the Chow test. First, the 
test assumes that the variance of the error terms in each regression is the same, i.e. the test requires 
that the model is free of heteroscedasticity. If this is not the case, then the Chow test may be 
inaccurate, especially when the two samples are of small size (Toyoda 1974).  Thus, it may be 
necessary to assume homoscedasticity to carry out the test. On the other hand, it is also stated that 
the test behaves well when at least one of the two sample sizes is very large. The pre-crisis sample 
consists of 601 observations, which might be sufficiently large. Second, the test is conditional on 
knowing the breaking point. This is not always the case, but I believe that a natural breaking point 
for the Z-Scores is at the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008, where many companies may have 
entered the distress zone. 
 
I performed the Chow test by splitting the time line into two parts and performing regressions for 
both the period before (2004 to 2007) and during the financial crisis (2008 to 2009), in addition to 
the whole period (2004 to 2009). In the regressions, the variable X is time (1=2004, 2=2005,.., 
6=2009) and Y is Z-Scores. Then I retrieved the Sum of Squared Residual Error from each 
regression analysis, which I used to calculate the Chow test statistic. The hypothesis for the Chow 
test of structural break follows: 
 
 
H0: The coefficients of the regression model are equal in separate subsamples 
HA: The coefficients of the regression model are not equal in separate subsamples (indicating 
a structural break) 
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4.2.4 Results 
 
Figure 5 displays the results of the Chow test. The test statistic is larger than the critical value for 
both manufacturers and non-manufacturers, so H0 is rejected in both cases, which means that there 
are significant differences between the Z-Scores before and during the financial crisis at the 5% 
level. Consequently, there is evidence of a structural break around the outbreak of the financial 
crisis, which indicates that the financial distress of enterprises listed on OSE may have been 
different before and during the financial crisis, in the sense that they were generally more distressed 
in the crisis period. 
 
 Figure 5  
                     Results of Chow test for manufacturers and non-manufacturers                  
 
 
4.2.5 Discussion 
 
The results indicate that there is evidence of a structural break around the outbreak of the financial 
crisis, which means that both manufacturers and non-manufacturers listed on OSE were more 
financially distressed in 2008 and 2009 relative to the years 2004 to 2007. This is consistent with 
the fact that most enterprises experienced weaker profitability and more uncertain prospects for the 
future. Additionally, the sharp decline in share prices in the crisis may reflect a change towards 
larger exposure to financial distress. However, for robustness purposes, the potential presence of 
heteroscedasticity and its implications should be looked further into, since this may influence the 
significance of the results. 
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4.3 Comparing the financial distress state of manufactures and non-
manufacturers 
 
This section concerns the comparison of manufacturers versus non-manufacturers during the 
financial crisis period of 2008 to 2009 and seeks to answer the research question: Which industry 
groups were most affected by the crisis? 
 
4.3.1 Introduction: The impact of the financial crisis on the Norwegian economy 
 
This section provides an overview on the impact of the financial crisis on the Norwegian economy 
at a national level, as well as certain listed enterprises that were particularly affected. 
 
The Norwegian economy prior to the Financial Crisis 
Figure 6 (Statistics Norway) 
                                                                                                      GDP Mainland Norway                  
The decade prior to the financial crisis was overall 
good, but there were also periods of decline in the 
Norwegian economy (Figure 6). When the dotcom 
bubble burst around the turn of the millennium, the 
economic growth in OECD economies decreased 
significantly. Simultaneously, a high interest rate 
differential against other countries resulted in an 
appreciation of the Norwegian krone. The 
Norwegian economy entered a recession in 2002. However, this recession was brief, since increased 
demand for Norwegian exports and lower interest rates placed the basis for a new upturn in the 
economy. The upswing was then particularly strong from 2003 to 2007. A primary cause was that 
Norway received large gains from increased world trade, where a distinct increase in demand from 
emerging economies resulted in a high growth for Norwegian export prices. Furthermore, high 
profitability and rising capacity utilization contributed to increased investments levels in Norway.          
 
Norway’s economy peaked in the beginning of 2008. High interest rates contributed to lower 
growth in private consumption. Moreover, decreased business investments and growth contributed 
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to reduced demand for Norwegian export goods. Thus, the Norwegian economy was already on the 
way down when the global financial turmoil escalated to a crisis in the fall of 2008.  
 
The Norwegian economy during the Financial Crisis 
The outbreak of the most serious global financial crisis in our time occurred in the fall of 2008, 
which initiated the strongest international recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The 
full consequences of the financial crisis remain to be known, which is evident today, as public 
finances have been weakened in many countries. Several countries are struggling with high 
sovereign debt and tight government budgets. This is a result of the financial sector support 
measures and the active use of fiscal policy to reduce the impact of the crisis (Finansdepartementet 
2011). 
Norway is among the countries that was the least affected by the financial crisis. A number of 
aspects of Norway’s economy and financial markets helped to mitigate the effects of the crisis. The 
Norwegian government implemented a series of measures to restore confidence in the financial 
system and sustain banks’ lending activities by improving their access to liquidity. 
In addition, Norwegian manufacturing was to a small extent exposed to goods that had the greatest 
decline in demand internationally, such as consumer durables (e.g. automobiles and consumer 
electronics). The demand from the petroleum sector remained relatively high throughout the crisis, 
which was essential for the Norwegian oil service sector. Moreover, Norway has a fairly large 
public sector and a well-developed social safety net, which may have contributed to prevent large 
falls in the demand for goods and services (Finansdepartementet 2011). 
Expansive monetary and fiscal stimulus also helped to stabilize the economy. Fiscal policy was 
heavily shifted in an expansionary direction and the Norwegian government initiated several fiscal 
stimulus packages to counteract the negative impact of the financial crisis. Norwegian authorities 
had greater flexibility in economic policy than most others due to Norway’s solid financial 
situation. This flexibility made it possible to perform the necessary support measures for the 
financial markets and the real economy, and also contributed to strengthen the financial market’s 
confidence in the Norwegian financial institutions. 
 
Facing weaker prospects for inflation and economic growth, central banks in most countries rapidly 
reduced interest rates, which helped to dampen the decline in the real economy. This was the case in 
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Norway as well. From the second half of 2008, Norges Bank gradually reduced the key policy rate 
to 1.25% in 2009. Lower interest rates quickly resulted in an improvement in the housing market 
and increased households’ demand. 
Figure 7 (Statistics Norway) 
                                                                                    Index of production Manufacturing 
Nevertheless, the failure of international 
financial markets gave acute challenges to 
Norwegian banks and companies, which resulted 
in the extensive actions of the authorities. 
Starting in the third quarter of 2008 to the first 
quarter of 2009, there was an evident decline in 
Norway’s gross domestic product. Less 
promising prospects for economic growth, 
increased lending rates and tightened bank 
lending standards, contributed to a fall in 
property prices and a decrease in household demand.   
Figure 8 (Statistics Norway) 
                                                                             Final investments in manufacturing 
There was a broad decline in the private sector 
for different industry groups. However, the 
decline was especially strong in manufacturing 
and construction, which is observable in the 
index of production for manufacturers (Figure 7). 
The impact on manufacturers is also apparent in 
the huge decline in order reserves and new 
orders. Investments in manufacturing show 
similar progression (Figure 8). Important factors 
that contributed to lower activity were reduced 
private consumption, investments and exports.  
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Figure 9 (Statistics Norway) 
                                                                                  External trade 
The fall in industrial production in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis is associated with the 
marked decline in demand at home and abroad. 
The temporary collapse in world trade had its 
negative impact, as the sharp fall in activity 
among foreign trade partners resulted in reduced 
demand for Norwegian export products (Figure 
9). The krone appreciation and high labour costs 
compared to trade partners contributed 
negatively as well. (Finansdepartementet 2011). 
Figure 10 (Norges Bank) 
                                                                                Operating margins (%) in various industries 
This is evident among listed companies, 
since the weakest developments among 
them were in the exposed sector (Figure 
10), which consists of both 
internationally exposed export and 
import industries (Norges Bank 2010). 
Examples of such industries are 
enterprises supplying the petroleum 
sector and the maritime construction 
industry.  The graph shows that the 
service sector, i.e. non-manufacturers, experienced a generally less dramatic fall in operating 
margins compared to manufacturing enterprises. A reason for this may be that the service sector is 
more sheltered from international conditions, consequently being less exposed to financial distress 
than manufacturers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
Figure 11 (Norges Bank) 
                                                                              Key ratios (%) for listed shipping enterprises 
The financial crisis hit the offshore industry 
hard, both in Norway and on a global basis. The 
industry is known to be capital intensive, pro-
cyclical and internationally exposed because of 
its dependency on the level of activity in the 
global economy. Oil and gas companies’ 
exploration and production activity is a key 
driving force for the demand in the industry, 
which came to a halt in 2008 due to lower 
commodity prices. Return on equity and operating margins decreased for listed shipping enterprises 
(Figure 11), as a result of lower operating income and increased writedowns due to low freight and 
market prices (Norges Bank 2010). Furthermore, reduced world trade resulted in surplus capacity, 
which led to a noticeable fall in freight rates and therefore lower profitability and debt-servicing 
capacity for many of the affected companies. Norwegian shipyards and related maritime producers 
experienced a drop in incoming orders, layoff of workers and bankruptcies.  
 
For many of the affected firms, the financing situation became demanding, since credit practices 
among banks were tightened, causing it difficult to finance new projects. Declining market prices 
for ships reduced collateral values, making the shipyards dependent on equity issues in order to 
comply with loan conditions on bank debt. In December 2008, as much as 51 % of offshore ships to 
be built in Norway with delivery towards 2011 lacked financing. The corresponding number in 
August 2009 was 40% (Norges Rederiforbunds medlemsundersøkelse 2009). It is clear that the 
situation in the industry was fairly severe.  
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Figure 12 (Norges Bank) 
Key ratios (%) for listed commercial                                  
property enterprises 
Moreover, the collapse of the American 
housing market and the general financial 
crisis also had an effect on the 
Norwegian property market. The house 
price index show drastic falls in prices 
through 2007 and 2008 (Statistics 
Norway 2011), which led to higher 
writedowns, lower turnover as well as 
reduced collateral values. Property 
companies are often highly geared, 
something that itself leads to potential problems. In addition, banks’ lending terms became tighter. 
This may make refinancing difficult and create a need to increase their equity capital in order to 
comply with loan conditions on bank debt. Figure 12 shows that the key ratios for listed commercial 
property enterprises were significantly reduced (Norges Bank 2010).  
 
Taking these observations into consideration, one would expect that the manufacturers listed on 
OSE were generally more affected by the crisis. It is therefore plausible that they have more Z-
Scores in the distress zone relative to non-manufacturers, which I have tested using the Mann-
Whitney test. 
 
4.3.2 Data 
 
For a given year, the applied data consists of a manufacturer sample and a non-manufacturer sample 
including all the enterprises in the respective groups. Each sample consists of all the corresponding 
Z-Scores (transformed into ordinal data) for these two groups in the relevant time period. 
 
 4.3.3 Methodology  
 
The Mann-Whitney test is a non-parametric hypothesis test that is appropriate for determining 
whether two samples of independent observations have the same median. The test allows its user to 
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assess whether one of the samples tends to have different values, either smaller or larger, than the 
other. Hence, it is a non-parametric alternative to the t-test. It involves calculating a test statistic by 
using the ranks of the observations rather than their raw values. The smallest number gets a rank of 
1, while the largest number gets a rank of N, where N is the total number of values in the two 
samples. The test statistic is found by ranking all the values from low to high, adjusting for ties, and 
summing the ranks in each group. If the sums of the ranks are very different, the P-value will be 
small, which may be sufficient to conclude that the medians are different (Ubøe and Jørgensen 
2006). 
There are several reasons why I chose the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test rather than the t-test. 
First, the former test is the logical choice when the data is ordinal. The Mann-Whitney test is also 
more robust against outliers than the t-test. In terms of efficiency, the Mann-Whitney test is slightly 
less powerful than the t-test when the samples are normal, with an efficiency loss of 5%. However, 
it is considerably more powerful for many other populations that are sufficiently far from normal 
(Conover 1980). As I have mentioned, this may be the case with the sample. It should also be noted 
that the test has little power when used on very small samples (Motulsky 2007), but this is not the 
case for the samples. Overall, the Mann-Whitney test is more robust and widely applicable than the 
t-test, and the efficiency loss is rather small in case of normally distributed data, which should make 
the Mann-Whitney test a more appropriate choice than the t-test.  
Furthermore, the Mann-Whitney test’s null hypothesis is that the two sample medians are equal (H0: 
η1 = η2). The alternative hypothesis can be left-tailed (η1 < η2), right-tailed (η1 > η2), or two-tailed (η1 
≠ η2). If the test statistic, U, exceeds the critical value for U at the chosen significance level, there is 
evidence to reject H0 in favour of HA. The test does not require the data to come from normally 
distributed populations, but it does make the following assumptions: First, the samples must have 
the same shape, but do not have to be symmetric. Second, the samples must be independent (Ubøe 
and Jørgensen 2006). 
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Figure 13 (14) 
Histogram of manufacturers and non-         
manufacturers 2009 (2008) 
I want to apply the Mann-Whitney test in order 
to compare the transformed Z-Scores of 
manufacturers and non-manufacturers during 
the crisis to determine whether their median 
values differ. The first assumption of the test is 
that the samples have the same shape, although 
they may have different medians and be 
asymmetric. As mentioned, the data is non-
normal, i.e. skewed during the crisis, with many 
firms having low Z-Scores. The gamma 
distribution is often used to model positively 
skewed data when random variables are greater 
than zero, which should make it applicable 
purely for illustrative purposes, as it gives an 
impression of how the shapes looks. One can 
see that the lines correspond to the histograms 
rather well. Figure 13 and 14 display the 
overlap of the histograms for the two samples, 
and shows that the skew towards the distress zone applies to both samples, although manufacturers 
are somewhat more skewed. However, I presume that the samples are sufficiently similar to satisfy 
the same shape assumption. 
 
The other assumption for the Mann-Whitney test is that the data are independent random samples 
from two populations. Two different samples/industries are arguably independent, but taking before 
and after measurements for the same sample/industry can be considered dependent, e.g. as the 
Chow test performed previously. The two populations must be independent; in other words, the 
observations from the first sample must not have any bearing on the observations from the second 
sample. I have ensured that the samples are independent, since I only compare manufacturers versus 
non-manufacturers in a given year, which are independent samples. Testing manufacturers during 
the crisis versus manufacturers during the pre-crisis period would have been dependent 
observations, and that is one of the reasons why I do not use that approach. 
39 
 
To summarize, the two populations are independent and seem to have approximately the same 
shape, and so I believe the Mann-Whitney test is suitable and reliable in comparing manufacturers 
against non-manufacturers. 
 
In order to determine whether there is evidence of a difference between manufacturers and non-
manufacturers during the crisis, I have computed the sample medians in order to find out which one 
is lower. The medians are equal (2) in 2008, while manufacturers have a lower median (1.5) than 
non-manufacturers (2) in 2009. Hence, taking into account that manufacturers have a lower median 
in 2009 and with history showing that they were generally more affected by the crisis, I test whether 
manufacturers have a lower median than non-manufacturers using the (left-tailed) Mann-Whitney 
test. If they are significantly different, this would indicate that manufacturers were more negatively 
affected by the crisis. Thus, I performed a left-tailed Mann-Whitney test with the following 
hypothesis for the years 2008 and 2009, as well as the two years combined: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 
Results of Mann-Whitney tests for 
manufacturers and non-manufacturers test 
2009, 2008 and 2008-2009 
4.3.4 Results 
 
Figure 15 displays the results for 2008, 2009, 
as well as 2008 and 2009 combined. The test 
statistic has a p-value of 0.0154 and 0.0159 
when adjusted for ties in 2008 and 2009 
respectively. Since the p-value is less than the 
chosen significance level of 0.05, I 
conclude that there is sufficient evidence to 
reject H0. Therefore, the data supports the 
alternative hypothesis that there is a difference 
H0: The median scores of manufacturers and non-manufacturers are equal (η1 = η2) 
HA: The median of manufacturers is less than the medians of non-manufacturers (η1 < η2) 
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between the sample medians. In other words, the results indicate that manufacturers had 
significantly lower Z-Scores than non-manufacturers in 2008 and 2009, which is equivalent to a 
greater probability of bankruptcy. The result of testing H0 on the “financial crisis” period of 2008 to 
2009 is significant at a 99% level (both adjusted and unadjusted for ties).  
 
4.3.5 Discussion 
 
This implies that, measured with Altman’s Z-Score, public manufacturing firms were generally 
more negatively affected by the financial crisis than public non-manufacturing firms. This is 
consistent with the observations made in the crisis, as the Norwegian industry was badly affected by 
the crisis. Reality shows that the weakest developments among the listed enterprises were in the 
exposed sector, while the service sector experienced generally less dramatic fall circumstances. 
Hence, even though the original Z-Score model was created several decades ago, it does an 
adequate job at classifying manufacturers as more financially distressed than non-manufacturers in 
the crisis. This may also imply that manufacturers are more exposed to financial distress in times of 
crisis, in comparison to non-manufacturers, which may be more sheltered against the development 
in the world economy.  
 
4.4 Differences among SIC-classified industries 
 
This section examines differences among the SIC classified industry groups during the financial 
crisis period of 2008 to 2009 and seeks to answer the research question: Which industry groups 
were most affected by the crisis? 
 
4.4.1 Introduction 
 
The source of financial distress differs among the various industry groups. According to the 
Norwegian business newspaper Dagens Næringsliv, over 33% of the companies listed on OSE were 
facing major financial challenges at the start of 2009, which can roughly be divided into the 
following five categories (Dagens Næringsliv 2009, February 02): 
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 Companies that are losing money (loss of revenues) and that can be forced to issue new 
shares at a low price 
 Companies that are struggling to get financing (lack of funding) for the implementation of 
new projects because of banks’ lending reluctance 
 Companies that are trying to restructure debt and raise money 
 Companies that have challenges with debt maturities (high debt) 
 Companies who risk violating their debt covenants 
 
4.4.2 Data 
 
I have sorted all the enterprises in the data into samples based on their SIC industry classification. 
As I have tested 2008 and 2009 as a whole, the samples consists of all the enterprises that were 
listed in the relevant time period and their corresponding Z-Scores (transformed into ordinal data).  
 
4.4.3 Methodology 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test is a generalization of the Mann-Whitney test, as it tests whether three or 
more independent samples of ordinal data have the same median. Thus, everything regarding the 
Mann-Whitney test discussed above applies to it. The calculation of the test statistic is quite similar. 
The same assumptions also apply here as in the Mann-Whitney test, i.e. independent random 
samples that have the same shape. Following the same reasoning as above, the samples are 
independent. Also, the test does not require the data to be normal, but instead uses the rank of the 
observations rather than the actual observations. In this sense, it is a non-parametric analogue of the 
one-way ANOVA test, but the Kruskal-Wallis test is powerful for data from many other 
distributions than just the normal distribution. (Ubøe and Jørgensen 2006). 
 
Figure 16 displays the shape of the samples, modelled and illustrated using the gamma distribution. 
Many of the industry groups seem to have a similar shape with a skew towards the distress zone, 
which should make them suitable for the Kruskal-Wallis test. However, the skew and size of the 
shapes varies among industry groups, as the density varies for some of them. Also, a few of the 
graphs are blank, because these industries only have observations in one of the zones (all 
observations on X-axis are 1, 2 or 3), typically due to few enterprises within those industries. This 
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implies that the results for some of the industries should be interpreted with caution. In this regard, I 
have gathered information on the development of the different industries’ index of production, as 
well as the percentage of bankruptcies at a national level corresponding to each industry group 
(Statistics Norway 2011). This data is aggregated, as each industry includes all company forms in 
Norway, and is used to compare the results of the SIC classified industries in order to find out of 
how well their predicted condition fits with reality. Comparing the results with real world 
observations should give a better assessment of how well the results correspond with reality, which 
I have done in the discussion section below. 
 
Figure 16 SIC Major Industrial Groups: Shape of samples 
 
 
In summary, I believe that the Kruskal-Wallis test is appropriate for testing whether the median Z-
Score is the same in each SIC-classified industry during the financial crisis, although one should 
bear in mind the shortcomings mentioned above. Therefore, I used the Kruskal-Wallis procedure to 
test:  
 
 
H0: The medians of all industry groups are equal 
HA: Not all medians are equal 
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However, rejecting H0 only tells us that there are differences among the industries, but it does not 
reveal what industries were most affected and how this compares to the other industries. Luckily, 
Minitab provides a Z statistic (which has no relation to Altman’s Z-Score) that gives a good 
indication of how the industry groups differ. It is merely a statistic used to determine how the 
median for each industry group differs from the median of all observations (Minitab 16 User 
Guide). The more negative the Z statistic is, the more financially distressed that industry is expected 
to be, and vice versa. Hence, I can get an overview of how distressed the different industries were 
relative to each other by ranking them by their respective Z statistic. The industries with a negative 
Z statistic are given a state as financially distressed, since the mean rank for each of these industries 
are lower than the mean rank for all observations, while the industries in the safe zone all have 
medians of 3. The remaining industries are placed in the grey zone. To test if this grouping of the 
industries using the Z statistic is appropriate, I used left-tailed Mann-Whitney tests to see if the 
median of the groups are different, in the sense that the scores in the distress zone are less than 
those in the grey zone and the scores in the grey zone are less than those in the safe zone. Rejecting 
H0 will indicate that the Z statistic does a good job at separating the SIC classified industries and 
stating their condition. This results in the following hypotheses: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4.4 Results 
 
Figure 17 displays the results of the Kruskal-Wallis test. The test statistic had a p-value of 0.002 
unadjusted for ties and 0.000 adjusted for ties. Hence, the results are significant at the 1% level and 
I conclude that there is sufficient evidence to reject H0 in favour of the alternative hypothesis of at 
least one difference among the industry medians. 
 
 
Figure 17 Results of Kruskal-Wallis test on Z-Scores in 2008 to 2009 
H0: The median scores in the grey zone and safe zone are equal  
HA: The median score in the grey zone is less than the median in the safe zone 
H0: The median scores in the distress zone and grey zone are equal  
HA: The median score in the distress zone is less than the median in the grey zone 
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As previously mentioned, ranking the different industries by their respective Z statistic should give 
an overview of how financially distressed they are relative to each other. The more negative the Z 
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statistic is, the more financially distressed that industry is expected to be, and vice versa. The 
ranking of the industries is shown below in figure 18: 
 
Figure 18 SIC industry groups placed in distress, grey and safe zone based on Z statistic 
 
 
 
The Z-Value for SIC 28 is 0.02, the smallest absolute Z-Value. This size indicates that the mean 
rank for SIC 28 differed least from the mean rank for all observations. Thus, this industry was 
typically somewhere in the “grey zone” and it should include both distressed and safe firms. The 
mean rank for SIC 37 was lower than the mean rank for all observations, because the z-value is 
negative (z = -3.9). It actually has the most negative Z statistic, which indicates that SIC 37 was one 
of the most financially distressed industries during the crisis. The mean rank for SIC 51 is higher 
than the mean rank for all observations, as the z-value is positive (z = 2.36). It has the highest Z 
statistic of all industries, indicating that it was relatively safe and that the companies within the 
industry avoided most of the impact of the financial crisis. Hence, the industries with a negative Z 
statistic are given a state as financially distressed, since the mean rank for each of these industries 
are lower than the mean rank for all observations, while the industries in the safe zone all have 
medians of 3. The remaining industries are placed in the grey zone. One should keep in mind that 
these are relative numbers, since there are exceptions within all industries. 
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Mann-Whitney tests of Grey Zone < Safe Zone and Distress Zone < Grey Zone are statistical 
significant at the 1% level (Figure 19), which indicates that the Z statistic does a good job at 
separating the condition of the SIC classified industries. One should also note that the median value 
of the different zones is according to the ranking of the Z-Scores that I used initially. 
 
Figure 19 Mann Whitney tests of distress zone and safe zone 
 
 
4.4.5 Discussion  
 
The DN article stated that 33% of all listed companies in Norway had great financial challenges at 
the start of 2009, which supports the low Z-Scores during the crisis. As follows, the five major 
challenges mentioned in the article seem to be relevant for many of the struggling enterprises. I 
have commented on the companies within the industries that stand out and contribute most to the 
result. 
 
Distress Zone 
The enterprises placed in the distress zone are characterized by having risk of bankruptcy within the 
next two years. 
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37 Transportation equipment 
The industry includes establishments engaged in manufacturing equipment for transportation by 
land, air and water. In this case, these are primarily offshore companies involved in manufacturing 
and repairing ships and boats, production of maritime equipment and associated services.  
On the basis of the Z statistic, SIC major group 37 was the most financially distressed industry of 
the crisis. 9 of 10 companies within the industries have Z-Scores in the distress zone in both 2008 
and 2009, something that is definitely alarming. Several of the listed enterprises in this group 
encountered liquidity problems during the crisis and required debt restructuring. For instance, 
Eitzen Chemical suffered from high indebtedness and needed to take action in order to ensure short-
term liquidity, which resulted in a complete financial restructuring (Dagens Næringsliv 2009, 
November 05). One of the affected companies, Petrojack, was not able to meet its debt obligations 
in late 2009. Liquidating the company’s assets was not enough to cover its liabilities, so Petrojack 
found no other option than to file for bankruptcy in 2010 (Dagens Næringsliv 2010, March 08). 
 
The index of production for all transport equipment producers fell considerably during the crisis 
(Statistics Norway 2011), which is consistent with the predicted state of this industry. 
This certainly contributes to the result that manufacturing firms were more affected by the crisis 
than non-manufacturers. It is also among the more financially unhealthy industries during the pre-
crisis period, since several of the affected companies were in the distress zone already in 2006 and 
2007. However, the industry accounted for only 0.40% of all Norwegian bankruptcies in 2008 and 
2009 (Statistics Norway 2011), which certainly contrasts the state of the listed enterprises.  
 
Classifying this industry group as the most financially distressed is in line with the observations 
made during the crisis, as the offshore industry both in Norway and globally was badly affected. As 
previously mentioned, return on equity and operating margins decreased for listed shipping 
enterprises. The industry is known to be capital intensive, pro-cyclical and internationally exposed 
because of its dependency on the level of activity in the global economy. Norwegian shipyards and 
related maritime producers experienced few incoming orders. Furthermore, reduced world trade 
resulted in surplus capacity, which led to a marked fall in freight rates and therefore lower 
profitability and debt-servicing capacity for many of the affected companies. The financing 
situation became demanding, since credit practices among banks were tightened. Declining market 
prices for ships reduced collateral values, making them dependent on equity issues in order to 
comply with loan conditions on bank debt.  
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65 Real Estate 
Declining housing prices and lower projected profitability meant that listed property companies 
were among those showing the largest falls in share prices. Fornebu utvikling, Norwegian Property 
and Faktor Eiendom all lost around 90% of their value over the course of 2008 (Oslo Børs ASA 
2008).  The listed property companies’ fall in stock prices correspond well with the Z-Scores, since 
all the mentioned companies were in the distress zone, except Fornebu Utvikling which was not 
classified as distressed. In addition, NEAS, Northern logistic property and Norgani Hotels were also 
in the distress zone in 2008 and 2009. Some of these companies entered the distress zone already in 
2007, which indicates that the Z-Score was sufficiently able to predict the distress of this industry. 
On a national basis, real estate firms accounted for 5.43% of all bankruptcies in Norway during 
2008 and 2009 (Statistics Norway 2011). 
 
Classifying this industry group as one of the most distressed is consistent with what one could 
observe in the financial crisis, as the Norwegian property market was badly affected and the key 
ratios for listed commercial property enterprises were significantly reduced. The sharp decline in 
housing prices led to higher writedowns, lower turnover as well as reduced collateral values.  
 
16 Heavy Construction Other Than Building Construction Contractors 
This industry consists of Oceanteam Shipping and Veidekke. The former company contributed most 
to this result, with Z-Scores in the distress zone in 2008 and 2009. Facing large deficits and great 
financial challenges (Bergens tidende 2009), it was among the companies that recorded substantial 
falls in its share price, losing about 95 % of its market value in 2009 (Oslo Børs ASA 2009). In the 
figurative sense this shows how indebted companies are particularly vulnerable if earnings start to 
decline considerably. 
 
Oceanteam Shipping is classified as a construction company, which was one of the crisis’ most 
affected industries. Construction stood for 23.66% of all Norwegian bankruptcies in 2008 and 2009, 
and 12.98 % if we exclude construction contractors, which is the relevant number for this industry.  
Also, the production index for Norwegian construction firms declined considerably in the second 
half of 2008 (Statistics Norway 2011). 
 
34 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and transportation equipment  
This industry consists of Akva Group and Kongsberg Automotive Holding. The latter company 
contributed most to this result, as Akva Group only was in the distress zone in 2009, while 
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Kongsberg Automotive Holding was classified as distressed in 2007, 2008 and 2009. Kongsberg 
experienced major liquidity problems during 2008 and lost more than 90% of its market value (Oslo 
Børs ASA 2008). It manufactures components for automobiles and was therefore exposed to 
consumer durables, which had one of the greatest declines in demand internationally. The major 
problems in the international automotive industry had a clear impact on the demand of the 
enterprise’s products. In other words, the company was indirectly affected by the global financial 
crisis. This emphasizes the dependency between national economies and how an international crisis 
can spread and have impacts on a small, open economy like the Norwegian. Kongsberg Automotive 
Holding made it through the crisis by substantial workforce reductions, restructuring its operations 
in order to adapt to market conditions and renegotiating its terms of debt (VG Nett 2008). The index 
of production for producers of fabricated metal products dropped markedly during the crisis 
(Statistics Norway 2011). 
 
45 Transportation by air  
The airline industry is among the most distressed industries both in the “pre-crisis” and “crisis” 
periods. Norwegian aviation was for a number of years strictly regulated in terms of prices and 
flights, but has entered a deregulated environment since 1994. Competition is far greater in a 
deregulated environment and often causes a number of firms to both enter the industry (Altman and 
Hotchkiss 2006), something that in fact has happened in the Norwegian airline industry in recent 
years. The Norwegian airline industry today can be characterized as a duopoly, where SAS and 
Norwegian Air Shuttle dominate the market. This has resulted in an industry characterized by tough 
price competition, which stresses the need to cut costs and increase efficiency. A recession would 
possibly intensify these factors and in this sense justify why the airline industry is among the more 
troubled industries in the crisis. The observation that the industry is struggling in the “pre-crisis” 
period as well strengthens the view that this is an industry with small margins and subject to 
financial distress, although Norwegian contributes most to this result.  
 
Both companies experienced falling share prices in 2008 (Oslo Børs ASA 2008). 2009 was a good 
year for Norwegian’s stock price, which gained 211% over the course of the year. Unlike its 
competitor Norwegian, shares in SAS experienced another difficult year and fell by more than 40% 
in 2009 (Oslo Børs ASA 2009). Both companies had Z-Scores in the distress both in 2008 and 
2009, while Norwegian also had it for several years prior to the crisis. 
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Although a turbulent industry, it only stood for 0.03% of all bankruptcies in 2008 and 2009. This is 
probably a result of relative few firms in this industry compared to other Norwegian industries. 
 
24 Lumber and wood products, except furniture  
This industry classification comprises Byggma, which is a manufacturer of construction materials. 
Reduced construction activity in Norway negatively affected the lumber and wood products (NA24 
2008, November).  A declining housing market affected construction that in turn had its negative 
effect on the demand for construction supplies. The industry encountered reduced activity and 
profitability over the course of the crisis period. Byggma has Z-Scores in the distress zone both in 
2008 and 2009.  
 
However, it is important to bear in mind that one company’s performance does not necessarily say 
much about the performance of a whole industry, although the index of production for this industry 
group fell steeply in 2007 and 2008. On the other hand, only 0.55 % of all bankruptcies in Norway 
during 2008 and 2009 were accounted for by this industry (Statistics Norway 2011). 
 
26 Paper and allied products  
The pulp and paper industry is a cyclical industry where profits fluctuate with the situation in the 
world economy. It has in recent years been distinguished by fierce competition and overcapacity 
within the industry, which can partly be seen in the context of lower demand for paper due to the IT 
revolution. This requires productivity improvements and balancing costs with the income potential 
(Skogindustri 2010). 
 
Norske Skog is no exception, which has struggled for a number of years with weak profitability and 
hefty losses caused by tough competition in the paper industry. The scale of the company's losses 
became a hot topic for investors already in 2007. The Norske Skog share price declined 55.63% for 
the year as a whole. In 2008, Norske Skog struggled for much of the year with its high indebtedness 
and a lack of investor confidence. The company closed 2008 with a fall in share price of 70%. 2009 
was also difficult year for Norske Skog, which lost 30% of its market value and dropped out of the 
OBX index (Oslo Børs ASA 2007, 2008, 2009). Norske Skog has Z-Scores in the distress zone in 
2008 and 2009, in addition to the years prior to the crisis, which strengthens the view that the 
company has encountered economic problems over the past few years. 
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0.08% of all Norwegian bankruptcies in 2008 and 2009 were accounted for by this industry, which 
is possibly because of few firms in the industry. As this industry group consists of only one 
enterprise, the results do not necessarily say much about the development on a national level. 
However, the index of production for paper and paper products illustrates that the industry has been 
struggling for several years, as it started to decline already in 2005 (Statistics Norway 2011). 
 
29 Petroleum refining and related industries 
This major group consists of Interoil Exploration and Prodution, which encountered large financial 
challenges after violating the payment terms and defaulting on a bond in 2009 (Dagens Næringsliv 
2009, May 29). The financing problem was solved through negotiations with the lenders. This is 
also one of the more financially disturbed industries of the “pre-crisis” period. Hence it seems like 
the company has struggled financially for several years prior to the crisis. In this industry, there 
were none Norwegian bankruptcies in 2008 and 2009. However, one should be careful interpreting 
industry performance based on a single company, since it is not necessarily representative for the 
whole industry. Hence the result is inconclusive. Interoil has Z-Scores in the distress zone both in 
2008 and 2009, as well as the years prior to the crisis. The index of production for this group shows 
a moderate downturn in 2008 (Statistics Norway 2011). 
 
20 Food and kindred products 
Based on the Z-Scores, the most distressed companies in this industry were Aker Biomarine, Lerøy 
Seafood and Copeinca. These are companies producing fish oil, fish meal and packaged foods, 
especially seafood. Because they are of an international character, the global economic 
consequences affect the demand for their products. Furthermore, household consumption in Norway 
declined in 2008, which might contribute to the result. Also, the prices of fish related products are 
known to be volatile. The Z-Scores indicate that they were mainly affected in 2008, where they 
were classified as financially distressed, partly due to the aftermath of falling prices and fish 
diseases. However, limited global growth in supply helped stabilizing the prices through the year. 
Furthermore, these export firms are affected by variations in the Norwegian currency. 2009 was 
actually quite a good year for several of the firms, since the list of winning companies on OSE that 
year features the aquaculture sector (Oslo Børs ASA 2009). During 2008 and 2009, this industry 
accounted for 1.01% of all bankruptcies in Norway (Statistics Norway 2011). 
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39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 
Based on the Z statistic, this was one of the most financially healthy industries of the “pre-crisis” 
period. The industry consists of Orkla and Funcom. On the basis of the companies’ Z-Scores, both 
of them have undergone a worsening of their financial situation since the “pre-crisis” period. 
However, the deterioration seems more dramatic for Funcom, a computer game developer, which 
contributes most to this observation. It is placed in the distress zone both in 2008 and 2009. The 
company’s stock price plummeted in 2008 after an unsuccessful release of one of their most 
anticipated games (Oslo Børs ASA 2008). In addition, earnings were decreasing at the time, 
although the company never faced liquidity problems, as it had sufficient cash reserves (DagensIT 
2009, February 23). Miscellaneous manufacturing industries accounts for 0.22% of all bankruptcies 
in Norway during 2008 and 2009 (Statistics Norway 2011). 
 
47 Transportation services 
The affected companies in this industry are mostly providers of transportation services for the 
offshore and onshore industries. Basically, many of the same arguments apply here as under SIC 
major group 37, since the performance of these firms follows the activity of the maritime industry. 
This is also one of the more financially disturbed industries of the “pre-crisis” period. The worst 
performers are Fairstar Heavy Transport and Golar LNG, which were classified as financially 
distressed in both 2008 and 2009. Fairstar obtained this classification in 2007 as well, which can be 
interpreted as a warning sign. Onshore and offshore transportation services stood for 5.62% of all 
Norwegian bankruptcies during 2008 and 2009. The index of production shows a decline in 2007 
(Statistics Norway 2011). 
 
27 Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 
Schibsted and Polaris Media contribute most to this result. Both the enterprises are media 
conglomerates and their business areas include newspapers, television, movies and publishing. The 
two companies share a high degree of dependency on advertising funding. The financial crisis had a 
particularly negative effect on advertising revenues, which consequently reduced the earnings of the 
companies (Hegnar Online 2008). Schibsted was classified as financially distressed in 2008 and 
Polaris Media in 2009. 0.57% of all Norwegian bankruptcies were in this industry during 2008 and 
2009. The index of production was somewhat reduced during the crisis (Statistics Norway 2011). 
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35 Industrial And Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment 
The most affected companies include Kverneland, Repant and Tandberg Data. They all share the 
fact that they produce durable goods and that their Z-Scores warned financial distress already in 
2007. The industry has low scores in the “pre-crisis” period as well. 0.17% of all Norwegian 
bankruptcies were in this industry in 2008 and 2009. The index of production for durable consumer 
goods shows a sharp decline since early 2008, while the same index for computer and electrical 
equipment decreased much in 2009 (Statistics Norway 2011). 
Joining the stock market in 2007 proved to be a tough experience for Repant, a company which 
manufactures reverse vending machines. Turnover was affected by the financial crisis, which led to 
the postponement of many purchase decisions. Also, the liquidity situation indicated that Repant 
needed additional capital (Dagens Næringsliv 2009, August 26). 
 
Kverneland is a producer of agricultural equipment, focusing on farm machinery. Farmers had 
trouble financing their purchases, which led to a decline in the demand of Kverneland’s products. 
The company, like the rest of the export sector, also struggled with an unfavourable strong 
Norwegian currency in 2009 (Nationen 2009). 
 
Another IT company that experienced major liquidity problems was Tandberg Data, which focused 
on data storage products. The company struggled for a long time with high indebtedness, 
bankruptcy risk and massive losses. It attracted a lot of attention towards the end of 2007 with 
shareholder disquiet, replacement of both the executive management and the board of directors, and 
last but not least, a warning that the company needed to raise more capital. The liquidity problems 
worsened during 2008 and the share price fell by more than 95% throughout the year (Oslo Børs 
ASA 2007, 2008). In 2009, it planned to get rid off most of its debt through raising more capital and 
converting debt to shares (DagensIT 2009, February 12). However, Tandberg Data failed to raise 
new capital and was not able to restructure its debt. It was ultimately left with no other option than 
to file for bankruptcy (Dagens Næringsliv 2009, April 24).  
 
Grey Zone 
The industries that are in the grey zone are generally characterized by including both distressed and 
relatively healthier companies. I will comment on the financially distressed companies below. 
 
 
 
54 
 
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 
Major group 28 consists mostly of chemical, pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies. This 
sector did partly struggle in 2007 and 2008. However, several of the involved companies did a 
comeback in 2009, since the stock exchange’s list of winning companies that year contains multiple 
firms from the health section. The pharmaceutical company Algeta is at the very top of the list, with 
an impressive 781% increase in its share price as the company passed a number of important 
milestones and kept the market happy with positive news. Clavis Pharma, also in the 
pharmaceutical sector, was not far behind with an increase for the year of 565% (Oslo Børs ASA 
2009). The index of production for chemicals displays a considerable decrease in the crisis period 
(Statistics Norway 2011). It should be noted that the Z-Scores for several of these biotechnology 
companies seem rather volatile, cf. the previous discussion in the data chapter.  
 
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics Products 
Major group 30 consists of Hexagon composites, which had a Z-Score in the distress zone in 2008. 
Demand for some of Hexagon’s products fell in the financial crisis, but there was never reported 
any crisis with respect to the company’s financials (NA24 2009). The lower demand is consistent 
with the fall in the industry’s index of production (Statistics Norway 2011). 
 
25 Furniture and Fixtures 
This major group is covered by the furniture manufacturers Ekornes and Hjellegjerde. The financial 
crisis affected the whole furniture industry in Norway, but it was Hjellegjerde that got affected the 
worst. Based on its Z-Scores, it went into the distress zone already in 2007, and stayed there in 2008 
and 2009. After massive deficits over a longer period, the company encountered severe financial 
problems in 2010, when it did not manage to repay its debt. Hjellegjerde was saved from 
bankruptcy through a private placement and was delisted from OSE later that year (E24 2011). 
Hence, the Z-Score did an adequate job at predicting the financial distress of this furniture 
company. The index of production displays a decline since 2008 (Statistics Norway 2011). 
 
50 Wholesale Trade-durable Goods 
This industry consists of Birdstep Technology and Contextvision. The former was most affected by 
the crisis, with a Z-Score in the distress zone in 2008. It is an IT company selling durable goods and 
has for several years struggled with deficits (NA24 2008, August 14). Being exposed to consumer 
durables is a possible explanation to the classification as distressed in 2008. 
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33 Primary Metal Industries 
This major group consists of industry giant Norsk Hydro, which never entered the distress zone. 
The industry’s index of production fell substantially in late 2008 and early 2009 (Statistics Norway 
2011), which may indicate that the international problems related to consumer durables had an 
effect on the demand of metal. Thus, it seems that Norsk Hydro managed the crisis rather well. 
 
49 Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services 
Among the companies in this group we find Wentworth Resources, which recorded one of the 
biggest falls in share prices in 2009 (Oslo Børs ASA 2009). The company disclosed major financial 
challenges and has Z-Scores in the distress zone in both 2008 and 2009. The index of production 
shows a decline during the crisis, although it is quite volatile (Statistics Norway 2011). 
 
9 Fishing, Hunting, and Trapping & 2 Agriculture production livestock and animal specialties  
At the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007 and 2008, falling prices and salmon diseases made 
life more difficult for a number of the fishery and aquaculture companies listed on the stock 
exchange - a sector that was the strongest performer in 2006. Marine Harvest and Grieg Seafood 
were among the companies that saw sharp declines in their share price. However, there were also 
some stronger performances in this sector. Salmar and Codfarmers are examples of companies that 
produced a decent share price performance. On the other side, the list of the winning companies in 
2009 features the aquaculture sector. It was a good year for Marine Harvest, Austevoll Seafood and 
Grieg Seafood, with increases in share price of 303%, 228% and 209%, respectively (Oslo Børs 
ASA 2007, 2008, 2009). These observations seem to correspond quite good with the companies’ Z-
Scores for 2008 and 2009. In addition, Aker Seafoods and Domstein had Z-Scores in the distress 
zone in 2008, while Codfarmers entered the distress zone in 2009. The observed development of 
this industry group is consistent with its index of production, which displays a sharp increase in 
2009 (Statistics Norway 2011). 
 
15 Building Construction General Contractors and Operative Builders &  
17 Construction Special Trade Contractors 
 
Major group 15 covers AF Gruppen and BWG Homes, while Major group 17 includes Grenland 
Group. All three firms have only Z-Scores in the grey zone both in 2008 and 2009. It comes as a 
surprise that these companies were not classified as distressed, given that construction was one of 
the crisis’ most affected industries in Norway on a national basis, although these industry groups 
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consists of only a few and relatively large enterprises. A declining housing market and banks’ 
reluctance to lend left its mark on the demand for construction activities, something that was 
reflected in the companies’ share prices. BWG Homes lost around 90% of its market value in 2008, 
which indicates that the future of the company was very uncertain. The market value of Grenland 
Group and AF Gruppen was also substantially reduced during the crisis (Oslo Børs ASA 2008). 
 
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 
Financial turmoil had its effect on the activity of this industry. Low oil and gas prices decreased the 
level of investments (Statistics Norway 2011), which in turn led to a lower demand for oil services. 
OSE is famous for its close relation to the oil industry, so there is no wonder that this industry group 
consists of 27 companies. 
 
The following companies were financially distressed in both 2008 and 2009 according to their Z-
Scores: AGR Group, BW Offshore, Norse Energy Corporation, Petrolia Drilling and Sevan Marine. 
A number of these companies encountered financial problems, including AGR Group and Petrolia 
Drilling, which violated their debt covenants and needed to adjust their capital structure (Dagens 
Næringsliv 2009, May 05). Sevan Marine faced the threat of bankruptcy in 2011. 
 
The Z-Score placed some of the companies as distressed in either 2008 or 2009: Norwegian Energy 
Company, Rocksource, Seabird Exploration, Seadrill, Songa Offshore, Petrobank and Scorpion 
offshore. Several of these companies needed refinancing in order to improve their liquidity, for 
instance Seabird Exploration (Dagens Næringsliv 2009, May 08) and Songa Offshore (E24 2008, 
November 06). Among the larger companies, Seadrill had a difficult year in 2008. 
 
A few of the companies also had Z-Scores in the distress zone as early as 2006 and 2007, 
suggesting potential problems in the future. 
 
73 Business Services 
Within this group are mainly companies engaged in IT, computer programming and software 
solutions. The companies that were classified as financially distressed in 2008 and/or 2009 are 
Apptix, Atea, Ignis, Global IP Solutions and Software Innovation. Some IT companies have 
generally short order contracts and relies on selling their products continuously. Therefore, they are 
quickly affected by reduced demand. This especially concerns Atea (DagensIt 2009, March). Global 
IP Solutions struggled with negative earnings and was acquired by Google in 2010. The index of 
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production for business services show a rather steady development during the crisis (Statistics 
Norway 2011), which may defend its placement in the grey zone. 
 
36 Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment and Components, Except Computer 
Equipment 
The two most affected companies within this industry group are Fara and Tandberg Storage. Fara, 
which is an IT company developing products for the transport sector,  struggled with deficits and 
needed to restructure its operations in order to reduce costs (Dagens Næringsliv 2008, October 16). 
The company is placed in the distress zone in 2007, 2008 and 2009. 
 
Tandberg Storage, a subsidiary and subcontractor of Tandberg Data, is another IT company that 
experienced major liquidity problems during 2008 due to high debt levels, which led to a reduction 
of more than 95% of its market value that year (Oslo Børs ASA 2008). After Tandberg Data’s 
bankruptcy in 2009, Tandberg Storage had no other choice than to file for bankruptcy, since its only 
customer was the parent company (E24 2009). According to the enterprise’s Z-Score, Tandberg 
Storage was considered as financially distressed in 2007 and 2008. Thus, the Z-Score successfully 
predicted the bankruptcy of Tandberg Storage. 
 
38 Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling Instruments: Photographic, Medical and Optical 
Goods; Watches and Clocks 
Among the companies in this industry, Simtronics is the only company that has a Z-Score in the 
distress zone. The company experienced lower margins and high interest costs, which might 
contribute to this result (E24 2008, November 24). 
 
44 Water Transportation 
This is one of the major groups containing most companies, so it is not a big surprise that the Z-
Scores are rather variable among them. Based on the Z-Scores in 2008, Golden Ocean Group, 
Green Reefers, Hurtigruten, Namsos Trafikkselskap, Norwegian Car Carriers, Tide and BH Ocean 
Carriers are in the distress zone, while DOF, Green Reefers, Norwegian Car Carriers, Tide, Wilson 
and BH Ocean Carriers are in the distress zone in 2009. 
 
Golden Ocean was in serious economic trouble during the first quarter of 2009. The company 
lacked the liquidity to meet its short-term liabilities, but survived by finding a solution with the 
lenders and performing a financial restructuring, where equity was issued and the company’s debt 
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reduced (Dagens Næringsliv 2009, April 02). Thus the Z-Score did a satisfying job at predicting 
Golden Ocean’s financial distress already in 2008. 
 
BH Ocean Carriers, Wilson and Green Reefers struggled with deficits. Hurtigruten and Tide, which 
are involved in passenger transportation, were met by declining demand. Several of these 
companies were also burdened by the decline in the maritime and offshore industries, as discussed 
above. 
  
48 Communications 
Eltek is another IT company that experienced major liquidity problems during 2008, which lost 
more than 95% of its market value. The company’s Z-Score does not fully capture this state of 
distress, since it is classified in the grey zone. It is the worst performer of this group during the 
crisis. The index of production of this industry group displays a steady increase during the financial 
crisis (Statistics Norway 2011). 
 
Safe Zone 
The industries that are placed in the safe zone are companies predicted to be relatively healthy. 
 
10 Metal mining 
Crew Gold Corporation experienced major liquidity problems during 2008, which lost more than 
90% of its market value. Crew Gold Corporation also disclosed major financial challenges in 2009 
(Oslo Børs ASA 2008, 2009). This is captured by the Z-Score, which places Crew Gold in the 
distress zone in 2007 and 2008. Therefore, the liquidity problems seem to be predicted by the Z-
Score. IGE Resources and Northland Resources are classified in the safe zone during and prior to 
the crisis, even though both companies experienced sharp declines in their market value in 2007 and 
2008. However, I believe that one should interpret these results regarding mining and exploration 
enterprises with scepticism, cf. the discussion in the data chapter above.  
 
59 Miscellaneous Retail 
This industry contains Komplett, an online retailer focusing on consumer electronics. The index of 
retail sales shows a moderate decrease in 2008 (Statistics Norway 2011). The Z-Scores indicate an 
overall good performance both during and prior to the crisis. All of them are in the safe zone, 
though the Z-Score in 2008 seems slightly lower than the rest. The company was in no manner 
unaffected by the crisis, since turnover did decline and the company had a deficit in 2008. Also, 
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retail is one of the industries with most bankruptcies on a national basis in Norway during the crisis. 
Given that this industry only contains one public company, it does not give a clear answer to how 
good its performance during the crisis really was. 
 
87 Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, And Related Services 
This industry classification group includes eight companies, who are mainly concentrated on 
engineering, seismic activities and surveying services. Six of them are in the safe zone prior and 
during the crisis, while two of them stand out as financially distressed. This concerns 
Electromagnetic Geoservices and Reservoir Exploration Technology. The former company 
experienced severe liquidity problems during 2009 and lost more than 90% of its value (Oslo Børs 
ASA 2009). It barely avoided bankruptcy. The latter company also struggled during the crisis. Both 
of the two companies’ Z-Scores warned about financial distress prior to the crisis. 
 
1.61 % of all bankruptcies in Norway during 2008 and 2009 came from this industry. I believe that 
the result of this group is more conclusive. This is because it contains several companies that show 
good performance, which should make the result more trustworthy, even though there is variation 
among the companies. The performance of the industry group also seems stable, since it is 
classified as safe in the “pre-crisis” period as well.  Thus I would regard this industry as relatively 
safe during the crisis. The index of production for this industry group is rather volatile, although it 
has displayed an upward going trend during the crisis (Statistics Norway 2011). 
 
51 Wholesale Trade-non-durable Goods 
Major group 51 consists of Cermaq and Marine Farms, which are classified as safe companies 
during and prior to the financial crisis. Both are companies producing non-durable goods in the 
aquaculture sector, so they should resemble the companies in major group 2 and 9. Consequently, it 
is plausible that they benefited from the favourable market conditions in 2009. However, if this is 
the case, the Z-Scores should have reacted more negatively in 2008, when the performance of the 
aquaculture sector was weaker. Cermaq’s share price seems to follow this pattern, which declined 
rather sharply in 2007 and 2008 and increased formidably in 2009 (Oslo Børs ASA 2007, 2008, 
2009). Thus, I emphasize that this is a questionable result, in the sense that the Z-Scores might at 
least be too optimistic in 2008. The index of production for non-durable consumer goods shows a 
fairly flat development during the crisis (Statistics Norway 2011), which indicates that it was to a 
small degree affected. This speaks in favour of placing the industry in the safe zone. 
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4.5 The relationship between financial distress and equity issuance 
 
This section seeks to answer the research question: What is the relationship between financial 
distress and equity issuance and how does this relate to the pecking order theory and market timing 
by managers? 
4.5.1 Introduction 
 
This section summarizes the development the securities markets in the crisis. Functioning securities 
markets are vital for financial stability. When crises occur, many companies often need to increase 
their outstanding debt or equity share. For many firms it will sometimes be too late to provide 
funding after the outbreak of a crisis. Hence, those who were best positioned when the crisis 
occurred are often the ones that escape a crisis in the best manner. 
 
Throughout 2008, it was difficult for Norwegian enterprises to obtain funding in the securities 
markets. However, market funding became more accessible in 2009.  During the financial crisis, 
public companies generally issued shares and reduced their debt, something that contributed to 
increased equity capital ratios. For the more solid enterprises, the higher equity ratios may be 
attributable to a high level of retained earnings as well, which was a valuable buffer during the 
crisis, as this enabled enterprises to draw on retained earnings in periods of reduced access to credit 
and new equity capital (Norges Bank 2009, December). Thus, the best positioned enterprises with 
high levels of retained earnings may have been less affected by the financial crisis. 
 
   Figure 20 (Norges Bank) 
                                                                                           Share issues (billions of NOK) on OSE  
              (OSEBX=OSE Benchmark Index)                 
In 2007, listed enterprises raised a record amount 
of new capital (Figure 20). However, new issue 
activity in the equity market decreased 
considerably in 2008, although a number of 
public enterprises still issued equity during the 
financial crisis. A portion of them were crisis-
related issues by companies with solvency 
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problems, where a recurring feature was that several of the issues were offered at an issue price 
below the equity price, as well as often being carried out at low prices compared to 2006 and 2007 
prices (Norges Bank 2010). Much of the decline in new issues can be explained by the severely 
lower level of new listings and fewer big projects, as well as reduced appetite among investors to 
provide risk capital for companies’ future plans. It may also be that some enterprises were unwilling 
to raise fresh capital in equity markets when prices are low (Norges Bank 2009, May).  
The equity market recovered in 2009, where investment appetite and optimism picked up again. 
Most of the issuers who needed to raise equity capital were able to do so. Companies listed on OSE 
raised one of the highest-ever annual totals of share capital that year (Oslo Børs ASA 2009). None 
of the equity market’s issues in 2009 is related to new listings on OSE, because no new companies 
were listed that year. Therefore, one might say that new equity issues on OSE helped to strengthen 
the financial state of listed enterprises. Common for many of the share issues in 2009 was the size 
of the discount offered in order to attract new capital, since it was not unusual to see new shares 
offerings at discounts of 35-40% to the current market price (Oslo Børs ASA 2009).  
 
Figure 21 (Norges Bank) 
12-month growth (%) in credit (C3) 
to mainland enterprises 
Many public enterprises found it expensive 
and difficult to obtain credit, particularly in 
2008 (Norges Bank 2009, May). Thus, those 
seeking to refinance their debt often 
encountered problems. This is illustrated by 
the clearly decreased growth in corporate debt 
in 2008 and 2009 (Figure 21), which also was 
negative for a short time period (Norges Bank 
2010). The growth in credit includes both foreign and domestic debt. According to Norges Bank’s 
lending survey, corporate credit growth fell significantly because of two main reasons.  
 
First, weaker growth prospects led to reduced corporate demand for loans (Norges Bank 2008, 
June). Several factors point to lower demand for corporate loans. Investments declined in many 
industries. Weakened economic growth on a global scale resulted in a reduced manufacturing 
output in Norway. Also, in order for companies with high debt to raise new loans, balance-sheets 
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needed restructuring due to lower corporate asset values (Norges Bank 2010). Another reason for 
the lower demand for corporate loans is the decrease in the debt-servicing capacity of most 
industries during the crisis, especially in 2008, as it became negative for approximately 30% of 
enterprises that year (Norges Bank 2009, December). Enterprises with negative debt-servicing 
capacity must often use their accumulated liquidity reserves in order to service their debt, which 
reduces retained earnings. In 2009, enterprises generally improved their debt-servicing capacity due 
to higher earnings and reduced debt levels, although there were considerable differences between 
industries that year as well (Norges Bank 2010). 
Figure 22 (Norges Bank) 
Banks’ credit standards for 
approving loans to non-financial 
enterprises (net percentage balances)                  
Second, banks became more reluctant to 
approve new loans due to tighter credit 
standards (Figure 22). The Banks’ credit 
standards for issuing new loans to non-
financial enterprises were tightened in 2008 
and the first half of 2009, although the 
credit standards were eased in the second 
half of 2009, making it easier for 
enterprises to obtain debt funding (Norges 
Bank 2009, December). The lower supply of loans during the crisis is related to the banks’ 
reluctance to lend, which was partly caused by problems linked to distinguishing healthy from 
unhealthy firms. Companies had to pay greater margins on interest rates, which may indicate 
compensation for increased uncertainty (Norges Bank 2010). Thus, information asymmetry related 
to debt financing may have increased in magnitude during the crisis. 
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Figure 23 (Norges Bank) 
Corporate bond debt  
   as % of total bank and bond debt                 
Historically, large and medium-sized 
enterprises with low risk have the largest share 
of bond debt (Figure 23). However, in recent 
years, enterprises associated with high and 
medium risk exposure have increased their 
bond debt the most, which is particularly 
evident in 2008 (Norges Bank 2010). 
Enterprises with high risk have a probability of 
default of 5% or higher. Throughout most of 2008, growth in bond debt for non-financial 
enterprises was negative. However, in 2009, primarily solid enterprises with high credit ratings 
were able to raise capital in the bond market. 
 
The considerable new issue activity in 2007 may be related to increased investment at enterprises 
with solid growth and confidence in the market. However, such new issue activity can also signal a 
turnaround in enterprises’ financial strength, as those with capital problems often invite fresh 
investment (Norges Bank 2008, December). In this respect, I have examined if there is a connection 
between those enterprises predicted to encounter financial distress and the timing of equity issuance 
by managers. Also, in the context of firms’ choice of capital structure in the presence of financial 
distress, I have studied if the relatively solid enterprises are relying on internal financing in form of 
retained earnings and if the financially distressed enterprises tend to use external financing. 
 
4.5.2 Literature review 
 
This chapter highlights relevant literature. The related literature spans two sections. The first section 
concentrates on the relationship between financial distress and equity issuance, while the second 
section summarizes relevant literature and empirical results on firms’ capital structure.  
 
Financial distress and equity issuance 
Several empirical papers have documented the distressed nature of firms that issue equity. Park 
(2011) documents a positive relationship between financial distress and equity issuance, by looking 
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at public and private issuance together and applying the distress measure of Campbell, Hilscher and 
Szilagyi. Using broad cross-sectional data on all publicly traded firms in the Center for Research in 
Security Prices’ database, he finds that distressed equity issuance primarily occurs through private 
offerings, rather than through public secondary equity offerings. Moreover, Hertzel, Lemmon, 
Linck, and Rees (2002) document the distressed condition of firms that issue equity privately by 
considering the long-run underperformance of private equity issuance. 
 
Relevant theories of capital structure and empirical evidence 
The empirical corporate finance literature does not agree on whether distressed firms should issue 
equity. The pecking order theory suggested by Myers and Majluf (1984) considers equity issuance 
as financing of last resort. It suggests that firms prefer internal financing, i.e. earnings retained and 
reinvested, to external financing. The theory starts with the observation that managers have private 
information, as they often know more than outside investors about the firm’s prospects and 
fundamental value. Consequently, the firm’s stock price may decrease when an equity issue is 
announced, because investors realize that managers may issue equity when their share price is 
overvalued. This problem with asymmetric information may be avoided by using internal financing. 
If external financing is necessary, firms prefer to issue debt rather than issue equity, which means 
that the amount of debt a firm issues will depend on its need for external financing. In the presence 
of asymmetric information, issuing debt signals that investments are profitable and that the current 
share price is undervalued. Hence, retained earnings are used first, and when it is depleted, debt is 
issued. When it is not reasonable to issue any more debt, equity financing is a last resort.  
 
The pecking order theory implies that the adverse selection problem is likely to be large when firms 
do not have promising investment opportunities, especially when the economy is in a downturn. 
According to the theory, the cost of issuing equity increase as the lemons problem grow in 
importance, making it harder to distinguish between good and bad investment opportunities, which 
leads to firms preferring to use internal capital or issuing risk-free debt (Myers and Majluf 1984 and 
Choe et al. 1993). 
 
While some papers support the idea of equity issuance as financing of last resort, others draw 
different conclusions. For instance, the pecking order theory has been criticized by Fama and 
French (2005). They conclude that issuing equity is not a financing of last resort, due to high 
frequencies of equity issuances and the order of financing decisions. 
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On the other hand, agency theories suggest that shareholders would not want the firm to issue 
equity when firms are distressed. Myers (1977) suggests that because of value transfer to 
debtholders, equity would be difficult to issue, which is known as the debt overhang problem. Also, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose that distressed equity holders prefer shifting risk to creditors 
rather than issuing equity and diluting future payoffs. This is known as the asset substitution 
problem. Such conflicts of interest between stakeholders, which theoretically affect all levered 
firms, are more likely to occur when the risk of financial distress increases. If the probability of 
default is high, managers and stockholders may be tempted to take on excessive risky projects. At 
the same time, stockholders may refuse to provide more equity capital, even if the firm has 
relatively safe and positive net present value projects.  
 
Another of the leading empirical explanations for equity issuance is that managers time the market 
and issue equity when their market prices are high, which is based on the observation that there is a 
long-run underperformance after equity issuance. Several empirical papers have documented this 
phenomenon, for instance Baker and Wurgler (2000, 2002) find evidence of pre-issue over-
performance and post-issue under-performance of firms, something that suggests market timing by 
managers. By examining the time series variation of equity issues’ share in total new capital issues, 
they find that equity issue volumes peak at times of high past aggregate market values, just before 
periods characterized by low market returns. Also, a survey performed by Graham and Harvey 
(2001) reveals CFOs to issue equity when market values are high. 
 
4.5.3 Data 
 
The types of issues include public, private, employee and IPOs. The overview of equity issuance in 
the relevant period was retrieved at OSE’s website (Oslo Børs ASA 2011). The approach was to 
sort the listed enterprises in the data into an issuer sample and a non-issuer sample for each year. I 
had doubts regarding whether I should include the companies with IPOs. Therefore, for robustness 
purposes, I placed the IPOs among those companies not issuing equity in the 2007 sample, and the 
results were still significant (not shown in the thesis). Additionally, the IPOs are not really a 
concern for 2008 and 2009, since they counted for a very limited number during those years.  
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4.5.4 Methodology 
 
This section involves testing the performance of companies that issued equity (issuers) compared to 
those who did not issue equity (non-issuers). The reason is twofold. First, I want to examine if there 
exists a positive relationship between issuing equity and financial distress on OSE prior to and 
during the crisis. Second, there may be a link between the financial state of the enterprises and their 
choice of capital structure.  
 
To investigate the market timing of equity issuing by managers, I used the Mann-Whitney test to 
examine whether issuers performed worse (had lower scores) than non-issuers in the year of 
issuance, as well as the years after issuance. If issuers are more financially distressed after issuing 
equity, this should capture the post-issue under-performance of firms, which may suggest market 
timing by managers. One may expect that this phenomenon is particularly evident prior to the crisis, 
e.g. 2006 and 2007, when stock prices were historically high, which would indicate pre-issue over-
performance. I excluded all companies that were listed later than the year of issuance from the 
sample, since they obviously did not have access to capital at that time. For instance, I removed the 
companies that were listed in 2008 (no companies were listed in 2009) when conducting the 
experiment on the companies issuing equity in 2007. As previously mentioned, the overview of list 
changes was retrieved at OSE’s website (Oslo Børs ASA 2011). 
 
With respect to the assumptions of the Mann-Whitney test, the same mindset applies here for testing 
the financial distress of companies issuing equity versus those who do not. I have only tested issuers 
versus non-issuers in a given period of time, which involves only independent data. Also, figure 24 
(shown on next page) displays the overlap of the histograms fitted to the gamma distribution. The 
shape of the samples seems to be generally similar, which should make the test appropriate. The 
histograms show that issuers in 2006 and 2007 tended to have high scores in the year of issuance 
and be generally more distressed in the years after issuance. In addition, issuers during the crisis 
seem to typically be distressed, as the median is lower for issuers (1 and 1.5) relative to non-issuers 
(2). Thus, I have formulated the following hypotheses to study the market timing by managers, as 
well as the relationship between financial distress and equity issuance:  
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(The only exception is for equity issuance in 2005, where the median of issuers (3) is greater than 
the median of non-issuers (2). Hence, in that particular test, I test if the median of issuers is greater 
than the median of non-issuers) 
 
 
Figure 24 Histograms of issuers and non-issuers in the year of issuance and the years after 
issuing equity 
 
 
Equity issued in 2009 
 
 
 
 
Equity issued in 2008 
 
 
 
 
Test of differences in financial distress for equity issuers relative to non-issuers 
H0: The median scores of issuers and non-issuers are equal 
HA: The median score of issuers is less than the median of non-issuers 
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Equity issued in 2007 
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Equity issued in 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equity issued in 2005 
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Equity issued in 2004 
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Moreover, I wanted to perform a test related to the pecking order theory using Mann-Whitney tests. 
The pecking order theory states that firms’ first choice of financing is retained earnings. Retained 
earnings are included in the Z-Score’s second factor (retained earnings relative to total assets), so 
the companies that are regarded as distressed often have a low retained earnings ratio. The 
weighting of this ratio is rather high for manufacturers and moderate for non-manufacturers. 
Consequently, many of the distressed firms with low Z-Scores are expected to be short on retained 
earnings during 2008 and 2009. I examined the companies that issued equity in 2008 and 2009 to 
see if they had lower retained earnings to total assets ratios, which would be in line with the pecking 
order theory.  
 
According to the pecking order theory, firms should not issue equity and increase their debt (use 
external financing) until retained earnings are depleted, which in this case may coincide with firms 
being financially distressed. I tested whether companies that issued equity in 2009 have increased 
their total liabilities more than non-issuers during 2008 and 2009. This was measured based on 
increases in book values of total liabilities and debt from the end of 2007 to the end of 2009. Only 
the issuers and non-issuers with increases are included in the sample, i.e. not those decreasing their 
debt levels. Further, I tested whether issuers of bonds were more financially distressed than those 
who did not. To be in accordance with the pecking order theory, one would expect to see the 
distressed companies using debt financing at the start of the crisis, i.e. particularly in 2007 and 
2008, before resorting to issuing equity at a later stage, i.e. in 2009. Oslo ABM, the largest 
secondary market for bonds in Norway, provided me with an overview of the listing of bonds and 
short-term fixed income instruments (Oslo ABM 2011). I used a similar approach as before, i.e. to 
sort the listed enterprises in the data into an issuer sample and a non-issuer sample for each year. 
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With regards to the assumptions of the Mann-Whitney test, following the same reasoning as 
previously, the data is independent. Additionally, figures 25 to 27 displays the overlap of the 
histograms fitted to the gamma distribution (shown on page 73). Regarding the increases in total 
liabilities, the shape of the samples seems rather similar. The histogram indicates that issuers of 
equity increased their book value of debt more than non-issuers. For the issuers of bonds, the shape 
of the samples seems to be quite similar in 2006 and 2007. The shapes are somewhat more different 
in 2008 and 2009. However, the histograms display that issuers of bonds are generally more 
distressed than non-issuers in 2006 to 2008, while the same is not evident in 2009.   
 
I was not able to model the samples of retained earnings to total assets to the gamma distribution. 
This is because the samples include a few negative observations due to negative retained earnings, 
which is not allowed in the gamma distribution. As a result, I only have the histograms to evaluate 
the shape of the samples, which makes it more difficult to make an assessment. Thus, I have 
performed a two-sample t-test in addition to the Mann-Whitney test in order to strengthen the 
results. On the other hand, the histograms show similarity, making the samples appropriate for the 
Mann-Whitney test, although issuers tend to have lower ratios. 
 
I present the following hypotheses related to the pecking order theory: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Test of differences in retained earnings ratios of equity issuers relative to non-issuers 
H0: The median retained earnings ratios are equal for issuers and non-issuers 
HA: The median retained earnings ratio of issuers is less than for non-issuers 
Test of differences in financial distress for bond issuers relative to non-issuers 
H0: The median scores of issuers and non-issuers are equal 
HA: The median score of issuers is less than the median of non-issuers 
Test of differences in increase of debt for issuers of equity relative to non-issuers 
H0: The median increase in debt for issuers and non-issuers are equal 
HA: The median increase in debt for issuers is greater than the median of non-issuers 
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Figure 25 Retained earnings to total assets ratio: 
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Figure 26 Increase in total liabilities and debt (book values): 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27 Issuers of bonds: 
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4.5.5 Results 
 
Testing financial distress after issuing equity (figure 28 on page 76), I found that issuers in 2009 
had significantly lower scores than the non-issuers. In other words, the firms that issued equity in 
2009 were generally more financially distressed than those who did not issue equity. The result is 
significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, I found similar results for the companies that issued equity 
in 2008. Issuers in 2008 were also more distressed than non-issuers for 2008 and 2009 combined. 
Both of these results are significant at the 1% level. Issuers in 2007 were more distressed during 
2008 and 2009 than non-issuer, which is also significant at the 1% level. Correspondingly, the 
companies issuing equity in 2006 were more distressed in 2007 to 2009, significant at the 5% level. 
However, the companies issuing equity in 2006 and 2007 were found to be insignificantly more 
distressed than non-issuers in the year of issuance, something that contrasts the 2008 and 2009 
results. Also, the companies issuing equity in 2004 and 2005 were not found to be significantly 
more distressed than those who did not issue equity. In fact, I found that firms issuing equity in 
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2005 tend to be less distressed, i.e. having higher median Z-Scores than non-issuers. Therefore, the 
results before 2006 seem rather ambiguous. 
 
Related to the pecking order theory, all tests reject H0, which indicate that issuers have significantly 
lower retained earnings to total assets ratios than non-issuers (figure 29). The results are statistically 
significant at the 1% level for 2008 and 2009, as well as the two years combined. The two-sample t-
test for 2008 and 2009 is also significant at the 1% level. Moreover, companies that issued equity in 
2009 have generally increased their total liabilities more than non-issuers during 2008 and 2009 
(figure 30), which is significant at the 5% level. Also, the results indicate that issuers of bonds are 
more financially distressed than non-issuers in 2007 (figure 31), which is significant at the 5% 
level. Issuers of bonds are not significantly more distressed in 2006, 2008 and 2009, although the 
2008 results are significant at 10% level. 
 
Figure 28 Results of testing financial distress in the year of issuance and the years after 
issuing equity 
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Figure 29 Results of testing retained earnings relative to total assets 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30 Results of testing increase in total liabilities and debt 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31 Results of testing financial distress in the year of issuance and the years after 
issuing bonds 
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4.5.6 Discussion 
 
The results are intriguing, since this documents a positive relationship between issuing equity and 
financial distress on OSE prior to and during the crisis. The findings of this positive relationship are 
consistent with those of Park (2011). This means that it is generally the companies that, according 
to the Z-Score, have the weakest performance today, or are predicted to encounter financial 
problems in the close future, that are financed with equity prior to and during the crisis. 
 
Companies that issued equity in 2006 and 2007 were more distressed during the crisis than those 
who did not. This observation may be related to the market timing of managers, as many firms 
might have seized the opportunity to issue equity when stock prices were historically high in 2006 
and 2007, at the presence of pre-issue over-performance. This is supported by the observation that 
the results are only significant after issuing equity, i.e. during the crisis, and not in the year of 
issuance in 2006 and 2007, which indicates post-issue under-performance. In other words, the 
positive relationship between issuing equity and financial distress seems to be strongest in 2007, 
2008 and 2009. If this is a general phenomenon, happening every year, I should have found more 
significant results in 2004 and 2005. This indicates that firms’ decisions to issue equity are 
influenced by past securities prices and current market conditions, in the sense that equity issues 
occur at times of high recent stock market performance and are aligned with rising economic 
activity. These findings are consistent with those of Baker and Wurgler (2000, 2002) and Graham 
and Harvey (2001). 
 
The pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) implies that the adverse selection problem is 
likely to be large when firms do not have promising investment opportunities, especially when the 
economy is in a downturn. The problem with adverse selection is evident during the crisis, since 
issuers were more distressed than non-issuers at that point. It may also be that unhealthy firms 
(lemons), which are equivalent to distressed firms with low Z-Scores, are issuing equity at 
overpriced share prices, particularly in 2007. Managers’ information about the firm’s true value and 
its future cash flows is likely to be superior to that of outside investors; there is asymmetric 
information between managers and investors. Capital structure can be used to signal the company’s 
quality. Healthy firms try to avoid issuing equity and use retained earnings and debt instead, while 
unhealthy firms are willing to issue equity. Also, managers who perceive the firm’s equity to be 
overpriced will prefer to issue equity. For instance, it could be that managers of these unhealthy 
firms had private information about a less favourable business climate in the near future, and 
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therefore seized the opportunity to issue equity while stock prices still were high. Thus, issuing 
equity in 2006 and 2007 may indicate that managers of bad firms time the market and sell 
expensively priced equity, as the issuers were found to be more distressed during the crisis, i.e. 
post-issue, than non-issuers. This means that the lemons problem may have been particularly high 
on OSE just before and during the outbreak of the financial crisis. Linking distressed firms to 
adverse selection and the lemons problem suggests an issue regarding information asymmetry that 
exists among distressed firms.  
 
Furthermore, issuers of equity in 2008 and 2009 are in general found to be more financially 
distressed than non-issuers, which add to the results related to the pecking order theory. Managers 
who perceive the firm’s equity as underpriced will have preferences to fund investments using debt 
rather than equity. Share prices declined sharply during the crisis, so issuing equity should 
definitely be a last resort for many firms, especially the financially distressed. Also, the cost of 
issuing equity increase as the lemons problem grow in importance, making it harder to distinguish 
between good and bad investment opportunities, which leads to firms preferring to use internal 
capital or issuing risk-free debt. Thus, we might expect that firms having access to retained earnings 
and debt financing would choose those options over equity during the crisis. However, the results 
indicate that issuers of equity in 2008 and 2009 have less retained earnings relative to total assets, as 
they possibly depleted it during the crisis. For instance, it may be that the enterprises with negative 
debt-servicing capacity depleted their retained earnings in order to service their debt. This indicates 
a need to increase liquidity and may help explain the fact that equity was issued at considerable 
discounts during the crisis, as some distressed firms may not have been able to raise debt capital due 
to banks’ reluctance to lend. Non-issuers have more retained earnings and may therefore have less 
need for external financing. This is also consistent with reality, as retained earnings were a valuable 
buffer during the crisis, something that enabled solid enterprises to draw on retained earnings 
instead of issuing equity. The observation that companies with little retained earnings are issuing 
equity is in line with the pecking order theory. Given the circumstances, these distressed firms may 
not have had access to the preferred sources of financing, so issuing equity may have been the only 
way out for some of them in order to improve their financial situation, while the companies in a 
better position may preferably use internal financing instead.  
 
As previously mentioned, the Z-Score models have the weakness of not being immune to false 
accounting practices. For some enterprises, the retained earnings account may be subject to such 
manipulation. In addition, retained earnings were not available in the ORBIS database for some of 
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the companies in the sample. Hence, I calculated the retained earnings for these enterprises using a 
standard formula. These are factors that may influence the results. 
 
Moreover, if companies do not have access to retained earnings, their next source of financing is 
debt. The relevant literature shows that growth in corporate debt for all enterprises decreased in 
2008 and 2009, as a result of lower supply and demand for debt financing. However, although the 
growth declined, it was still positive most of the time. Companies that issued equity in 2009 have 
generally increased their total liabilities more than non-issuers during 2008 and 2009. Keeping in 
mind that issuers were found to have less retained earnings, this indicates that the distressed 
companies to a greater extent financed their operations with equity and debt (external financing) 
during the crisis period. Moreover, the results indicate that issuers of bonds are more financially 
distressed than non-issuers in 2007. Issuers of bonds were not found to be significantly more 
distressed in 2006, 2008 and 2009, although the 2008 results were significant at the 10% level. 
Hence, this indicates that distressed companies used debt financing to a larger extent in 2007 and 
2008, i.e. the first years of the crisis, and therefore possibly prior to equity financing in 2008 and 
2009, which also is according to the pecking order theory. The fact that enterprises associated with 
high and medium risk exposure increased their bond debt the most in 2007 and 2008 is consistent 
with the observation that issuers of bonds, who are more distressed and have higher risk of default, 
increased their debt more than non-issuers.  
 
This may have implications for the capital structure of firms. Financially distressed companies had 
less retained earnings during the crisis, while it is likely that the financially stronger companies with 
higher Z-Scores to a greater degree used retained earnings as financing. Additionally, financially 
distressed companies were to a greater extent financed by debt in 2007 and possibly 2008 than the 
companies with better performance. Finally, financially distressed companies used more equity 
financing in 2008 and 2009 relative to the more solid firms. Since retained earnings and debt were 
not readily available in general, these distressed firms might have needed to issue equity at low 
share prices as a last resort. Consequently, this pattern observed for distressed firms in the financial 
crisis seems to follow the pecking order theory of corporate finance proposed by Myers and Majluf 
(1984). 
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4.6 Probability of default on Oslo Stock Exchange 
 
This section seeks to answer the research question: How did the probability of default on OSE 
evolve prior to and during the crisis? 
 
4.6.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this section is to make an estimate of the default probability on OSE prior and 
during the financial crisis. While the Z-Score models provide a continuous evaluation of corporate 
health, we cannot derive an estimate directly from the score. Thus, I have made an estimate using 
Altman’s bond rating equivalent method, which is based on the experience of over 2000 defaulting 
firms over the past 35 years.  
 
4.6.2 Methodology 
 
The bond rating equivalent method consists of three steps (Altman and Hotchkiss 2006): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on either of the Z-Score models, one can calculate a score and link it to a bond rating 
equivalent, which leads to the estimated probability of default by obtaining it from one of the bond 
and bank loan rating agencies. Rating agencies are not perfect in their credit risk assessments, but 
they do provide important and consistent estimates of default. All the 180 enterprises in my data 
sample are included in the estimation of the default probability, which is based on the average of 
each industry group. 
 
I have used Standard & Poor’s one-year global corporate default rates (Standard & Poor’s 2011) as 
a measure of expected default probability. Figure 32 displays S&P’s global corporate annual default 
rates by rating category, as well as their rating hierarchy of credit and default risk. Moreover, I had 
the choice between using average default rates over a longer period and default rates for a specific 
1. The calculation of Z-Scores 
2. Mapping the Z-Score to a bond rating equivalent 
3. Utilizing historical default rates in order to specify an estimate of default 
probability, given a specific bond rating 
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year. The average method may dampen the results, since default rates can vary significantly from 
one year to the next, thereby varying significantly from the average. Thus, one might expect that the 
average method gives too low probabilities during times of crisis and too high probabilities during 
periods of solid economic growth. Consequently, I have decided to use the historic global default 
rates for each year, since I want to investigate differences between the “financial crisis” period and 
the “pre-crisis” period. 
 
Figure 32 Global corporate annual default rates by rating category 
 
 
The companies that were classified as in default (D) and did not go bankrupt that year, have been 
given the same probability as CCC. This should reflect the substantial risk of bankruptcy, as a 
company rated CCC is regarded as vulnerable and dependent upon favourable business, financial, 
and economic conditions to meet its financial commitments (Standard & Poor’s 2011). 
 
Altman specifies the bond rating equivalents for the Z-Score and Z”-Score models (Altman and 
Hotchkiss 2006). These were based on recent samples of average Z-Scores for the various major 
bond rating classes and calibrates the Z-Scores to the bond ratings. Figure 33 lists the bond rating 
equivalents for various Z-Score intervals (manufacturers). For instance, triple-B bonds have an 
average Z-Score of 2.81. Based on the average of the Z-Score, the lower limit is 2.595 and the 
upper limit is 3.725.  One can then observe the historic likelihood that a company with a certain Z-
Score and bond rating equivalent has defaulted. For instance, a manufacturer with a Z-Score of 1.8 
in 2005 has a bond equivalent rating of B, which corresponds to a one-year default probability of 
1.73% in that particular year, based on S&P’s estimates. Figure 33 also display the bond rating 
equivalents for the Z”-Score (non-manufacturers). For instance, a triple-B rating has a lower limit of 
5.85 and an upper limit of 6.25. Recall that a score of 1.8 and 4.35 is the upper bound of the distress 
zone for manufacturers and non-manufacturers, respectively. This is approximately equal to a rating 
of B. (Altman and Hotchkiss 2006). 
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Figure 33 Bond rating equivalents for Z-Score model (manufacturers) and Z”-Score model 
(non-manufacturers) 
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4.6.2 Results 
 
The resulting estimates of the default probabilities/expected defaults are summarized below: 
 
Figure 34 Estimates of the probability of default 
 
4.6.3 Discussion 
 
Based on these estimates (figure 34), the probability of default increased substantially in 2008 and 
2009 compared to the “pre-crisis” period of 2004 to 2007. It went from being practically non-
existent to quite high in 2008 and 2009, gradually increasing from 2004 and 2005. Furthermore, 
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manufacturers had slightly higher probabilities on average than non-manufacturers during the crisis, 
while the opposite was true in 2004 to 2007, which is consistent with the test results. The 
probabilities of the SIC groups, as one should expect, show variety. Some seem a little high, which 
might be due to few companies in those groups. I stress that these are only estimates, but the 
expected default rates should at least give an idea of how the default probability on OSE evolved 
around the crisis 
 
The findings are consistent with the sharp declines in share prices, which indicate that companies 
were priced at a significant probability of going bankrupt. 
 
The sharp increase in default probabilities implies that bankruptcy costs also increased by a fair 
amount in the crisis, since these should be positively correlated. In addition, conflicts between 
stockholders and debtholders may become more serious when the chance of bankruptcy increases, 
in terms of the asset substitution and the debt-overhang problems. If the probability of default is 
high, managers and stockholders may be tempted to take on projects of excessive risk. At the same 
time, stockholders may refuse to contribute more equity capital even if the firm has safe and 
positive NPV projects. 
 
4.7 The predictive ability of Altman’s Z-Score within the financial 
crisis 
 
This section seeks to answer the research question: What are the implications of the financial crisis 
on the predictive ability of the Z-Score models? 
 
4.7.1 Introduction 
 
This section examines whether the Z-Score has good predictive power in times of crisis. In this 
respect, I will look at firms that went bankrupt, but were not expected to do so according to the Z-
Score (Type I error). Also, I will consider the firms that were classified as distressed and did not go 
bankrupt (Type II Error).  
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Bankruptcies on OSE 
The bankruptcies on OSE came in 2009 and 2010, in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Tandberg 
Data and Tandberg Storage went bankrupt in 2009, while Petrojack went bankrupt in early 2010 
(RavnInfo 2011). OSE has historically been relatively spared from many bankruptcies, but there is 
little doubt that the risk of bankruptcy increased during the financial crisis. Financial problems will 
always worry investors, but considering the market conditions during the crisis, where capital was 
scarce, investors are afraid of single companies going bankrupt due to lack of financing. This 
attention did not surprisingly affect the stock price development of the bankrupt companies, since 
they lost much of its market value due to what is characterized as risk of bankruptcy. 
 
4.7.2 Methodology 
 
Type I Error  
The Altman Z-Score was found to be 72% accurate in predicting bankruptcy two years prior to the 
event in its initial test. In subsequent tests, the model was found to be 80-90% accurate in predicting 
bankruptcy one year prior to the event. Altman calculates the Type I error as the percentage of 
bankrupt firms that were incorrectly classified as non-bankrupt by the Z-Score model (Altman 
2000). I have applied the same method as Altman in order to assess the models’ predictive ability of 
bankruptcy.  
 
Type II Error 
Altman has found that the Type II error (classifying the firm as distressed when it does not go 
bankrupt the next two years) has increased substantially with as much as 15-20% of all firms. 
To calculate the Type II error, Altman performs a rigorous test of the Z-Score model’s effectiveness 
by selecting a sample of below-average performers that have encountered earning problems and 
then calculating the Z-Scores for these companies. In order to perform the test, Altman selected a 
sample of 66 non-bankrupt firms on the basis of net income (deficit) reports in the years 1958 and 
1961, with 33 from each year, where about 65% had suffered two or three years of negative profits 
in the previous three years. Altman chose the firms regardless of their asset size, with the only two 
criteria being that they were non-bankrupt manufacturers that suffered losses in the year 1958 or 
1961. The companies are then evaluated by the Z-Score model to determine their bankruptcy 
potential. His results show that 14 of the 66 firms are incorrectly classified as bankrupt, with the 
remaining 52 correctly classified, which equals a Type II error of 21% (Altman 2000). 
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I have applied a similar robust method as Altman did, where I only include the non-bankrupt 
enterprises that have reported net income deficits during 2004 to 2009. The Type II error was 
examined in both the financial crisis and pre-crisis periods, in addition to the period as a whole. For 
each period, the Type II error was calculated by dividing the number of companies with Z-Scores in 
the bankrupt (distress) zone by the total number of companies with deficits. I have also 
differentiated between manufacturers and non-manufacturers to find out which Z-Score model that 
produces the most prediction errors.  
 
4.7.3 Results 
 
Type I Error 
Three companies on OSE went bankrupt during the period under consideration. All of them are 
manufacturers, which should contribute somewhat to manufacturers being more distressed. Among 
these three companies, the Z-Score successfully predicted the financial distress of two of them one 
year ahead of the bankruptcy. This equals a Type I error of 33.33% one year prior to bankruptcy. 
However, all bankruptcies were predicted when considering the Type I accuracy two years ahead. 
Therefore, it seems that the best way to interpret the Z-Score is to consider its development over 
several years and conclusions should arguably not be drawn based on a single year. 
 
Tandberg Storage went bankrupt in 2009. The company had deteriorating Z-Scores from 2005 to 
the year of bankruptcy. In 2005, it was in the safe zone, while in the 2006, it fell into the grey zone. 
In 2007 and 2008 it had a Z-Score of 1.68 and -5.01 respectively. These scores can be interpreted in 
the following way: Tandberg Storage went into a state of financial distress already in 2007, but its 
conditions worsened significantly during 2008. Thus the Z-Score does a good job at predicting 
Tandberg Storage’s way towards bankruptcy. 
 
Tandberg Data is a different story. Based on its Z-Scores, the firm went from the grey zone to the 
distress zone already in 2005, indicating that it encountered financial challenges several years prior 
to its bankruptcy. Then it continued being in a state of financial distress until 2008, where the Z-
Score increased and again placed the firm in the grey zone. The company went bankrupt the next 
year. Consequently, the Z-Score actually predicted the bankruptcy two years before the incident, but 
it was inconclusive one year prior to bankruptcy. So, one may evaluate the result in the following 
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way: The Z-Score did not successfully predict the bankruptcy of Tandberg Data, although it showed 
clear indications of distress in the years before the incident. 
 
Petrojack moved from the grey zone to the distress zone already in 2007. It has a Z-Score of 0.73, -
1.42 and -0.32 in 2007, 2008 and 2009 respectively. Hence, the company seemed to be struggling 
financially several years during the crisis before finally going bankrupt in 2010. The Z-Score 
successfully predicted Petrojack’s bankruptcy. So it seems that the Z-Score was an adequate tool to 
assess the financial state of Petrojack prior to its bankruptcy.  
 
As I have mentioned above, the Altman Z-Score was found to be 72% accurate in predicting 
bankruptcy two years prior to the event in its initial test. In subsequent tests, the model was found to 
be 80-90% accurate in predicting bankruptcy one year prior to the event. The results are comparable 
to this. However, in contrast to Altman’s results, the results are based on just a few bankruptcies. 
Thus, the results from Type I error are not very reliable.  
 
Type II Error 
 
Figure 35 Type II Error 
Type II Error Financial crisis period Pre-crisis period Overall
Manufacturers 50.98% 22.22% 36.19%
Non-Manufacturers 41.49% 28.57% 34.90%
All enterprises 44.83% 26.32% 35.35%  
 
The results (figure 35) indicate that both manufacturers and non-manufacturers have substantially 
higher Type II error in the financial crisis period of 2008 to 2009. These numbers seem quite high 
when compared to the pre-crisis years of 2004 to 2007, where the Type II error is generally more in 
line with Altman’s results. Manufacturers have higher Type II error than non-manufacturers in the 
crisis, while the opposite seems to be the case in the pre-crisis period. The Type II error for non-
manufacturers is relatively high in both periods, yet more stable, as the Type II error for 
manufacturers has the largest increase in the financial crisis period.  
 
The overall Type II error for all enterprises is 35.35%, which seems rather high compared to 
Altman’s results. This observation is mostly due to the high Type II error in the crisis period, 
measured at a total of 44.83%, as the pre-crisis period has a considerably lower Type II error. 
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Consequently, it seems that the Z-Score models incorrectly classify many of the distressed non-
bankrupt enterprises as bankrupt during the financial crisis, which results in many false signals 
regarding the actual state of the distressed enterprises. A potential reason for the high Type II error 
may be that the models have problems tackling the extraordinary and quite extreme conditions of 
the financial crisis. However, it is important to bear in mind that failing to predict bankruptcy is not 
necessarily equivalent with failing to predict financial distress, since it is possible for an enterprise 
to have severe financial problems without going bankrupt.  
 
In other words, classifying enterprises as distressed, when in fact they do not go bankrupt, does not 
necessarily affect the Z-Score’s ability to predict and measure financial distress.  
 
4.7.4 Discussion 
 
Considering the high levels of the Type II error, one may question why the stock exchange did not 
see as high bankruptcy rates as predicted by the Z-Score models. Also, the sharp declines in share 
prices indicate that companies were priced with a significant probability of going bankrupt, which is 
consistent with the findings. This section discusses potential reasons for the high Type II error, as 
well as the large difference between the “pre-crisis” and “financial crisis” periods. 
 
The first possible reason is related to the fact that expansive monetary and fiscal stimulus performed 
in late 2008 and early 2009 helped to stabilize the economy. Fiscal policy was heavily shifted in an 
expansionary direction and the Norwegian government initiated several fiscal stimulus packages to 
counteract the negative impact of the financial crisis. Norges Bank reduced interest rates rapidly, 
which also helped to dampen the decline in the real economy. It may be that these actions are not 
reflected in the Z-Score, particularly in 2008. The government support measures to the industrial 
sector helped stabilizing the development quickly, which may help explain why manufacturers had 
the highest Type II error and probability of default. 
 
Moreover, the restructuring of firms’ capital structure may be a possible explanation. Banks have 
shown a flexible attitude to existing customers who have breached loan terms during the financial 
crisis. Some enterprises have had the terms of their loans changed through negotiations, owing to 
major payment problems, while some have had their repayment of debt postponed. Initiatives 
implemented by the Norwegian government may have helped to improve the situation in the bank 
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sector, hence securing its role as a capital provider. These factors have probably reduced the 
number of bankruptcies and banks’ actual losses, which adds to the explanation of the high levels of 
Type II error for both manufacturers and non-manufacturers. 
 
The previous results indicate that the issuers of equity were more financially distressed than the 
non-issuers. Hence, the distressed firms generally issued more equity prior to and during the crisis. 
As a result, a well-functioning market for issuing equity may have contributed to saving these firms 
from bankruptcy. The fact that a number of public enterprises issued equity during the financial 
crisis, where a portion of them were due to solvency problems, is consistent with this. Thus, one 
might say that new equity issues on OSE helped to strengthen the financial state of listed 
enterprises. This could also be a reason for the high levels of Type II error. In addition, it may be 
that some managers of these unhealthy firms had private information about a less favourable 
business climate in the near future, and therefore seized the opportunity to issue equity while stock 
prices still were high and therefore preventing bankruptcy in the crisis. 
 
When asset prices deviate significantly from the fundamentals, there may be an asset price bubble. 
The financial crisis was characterized by substantial and credit-driven gains in equity and housing 
prices before the crisis, which was followed by a sharp decline when the crisis occurred. Stock price 
bubbles can potentially have contributed to making the Z-Scores for manufacturing firms too high 
prior to the crisis, increasing the Type I error, since the market value of equity may have been 
overpriced, which is one of the factors used to compute the Z-Score for manufacturers. An 
implication of this is a worsening of the Z-Score’s predictive ability of bankruptcies, in the sense 
that the assessment of financial health may be too optimistic for some companies. Further, the sharp 
decline in stock prices contributes much to the low Z-Scores for manufacturers, which reflects the 
systematic risk. This may have been a situation where the market value of the companies actually 
was lower than their true fundamental value, i.e. a negative stock price bubble, which may result in 
higher levels of Type II error than in normal stock market conditions. As a result, the assessment of 
financial health may have been too pessimistic for some companies.  
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5 Conclusion 
 
This section concludes on the research questions presented in this thesis. 
 
The thesis was motivated by the opportunity to study financial distress at a large scale in the recent 
financial crisis. Corporate failures, widespread influence on publicly listed enterprises and extensive 
actions by the authorities during the crisis point to the need for extended and deepened research on 
financial distress. In this respect, strengthening the research on enterprises exposure to distress risk 
and investigating the risk behaviour in financial distress is of vital importance.  
 
The results of the Chow test indicate that there is evidence of a structural break around the outbreak 
of the financial crisis, which means that the enterprises listed on OSE were more financially 
distressed in 2008 and 2009 compared to the years 2004 to 2007.  
 
I find evidence that manufacturers listed on OSE were in general more financially distressed than 
non-manufacturers in the recent financial crisis, something that is consistent with what one could 
observe at a national level. Particularly, the findings indicate that among the worst affected are 
enterprises exposed to consumer durables, export and import industries dependent on international 
trade, offshore and shipping, as well as enterprises engaged in commercial properties. This implies 
that these industries are particularly exposed to financial distress in times of crisis. Among the best 
performers were enterprises involved in engineering, seismic activities and surveying services. 
Many of the findings related to the industry groups also seem to be according to reality. Thus, the 
Altman Z-Score models prove to be accurate in correctly classifying the financial distress of firms 
and relevant even in times of crisis.  
 
The Type II error of classifying firms as bankrupt when they do not go bankrupt increased 
substantially over the course of the crisis, with as much as 40-50% of the enterprises incorrectly 
classified as bankrupt. This indicates that the Z-Scores ability to predict bankruptcies worsened 
significantly in the financial crisis, although its ability to identify financial distress in general still 
may be intact. The increase in financial distress also implies a greater probability of default, which 
was estimated to be in excess of 10% during the crisis, in contrast to the pre-crisis period where it 
was almost non-existent.  
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Moreover, on the topic of capital structure, I document a positive relationship between financial 
distress and equity issuance in the financial crisis. Also, I find evidence that supports both the 
market timing theory and pecking order theory of corporate finance. Evidence of the market timing 
of managers was found just before the outbreak of the crisis, i.e. in 2006 and 2007. The results 
indicate that equity issuance at historically high stock prices was followed by post-issue under-
performance, as the issuers tended to be more financially distressed than non-issuers. Related to the 
pecking order theory, the findings indicate that the financially distressed enterprises followed the 
predicted pattern of the theory during the crisis, in the sense that internal financing typically was 
used before external financing. Related to this, the findings indicate that the adverse selection 
problem was particularly evident among financially distressed enterprises which issued equity just 
prior to and during the crisis, which also is in line with the pecking order theory.  
 
Further research 
Perhaps the most important weakness of the thesis is that I am relying solely on the Z-Score models 
as the only measure of financial distress. In order to strengthen and verify the results, the Z-Scores 
should be combined with other credit risk models, for instance Ohlson’s O-Score. Another 
suggestion for further research relates to the findings on the market timing theory and pecking order 
theory prior to and in the financial crisis. It could be interesting to use a larger sample than I have 
done, in addition to covering a longer time period. For instance, it may be that the findings are 
particularly evident prior to and during times of crisis, which can be examined by studying other 
crises and recessions. Moreover, in terms of the Chow test on structural breaks, the potential 
presence of heteroscedasticity might have implications for the results. Thus, this is something that 
can be examined further to strengthen the results. 
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7 Appendix: Summary of data sample 
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